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Abstract

THE UTILIZATION OF COMMUNICATIONAL CUES BY
ONE- AND TWO-YEAR-OLD CHILDREN
by
Rhianon Allen

Adviser:

Professor Joseph Glick

The relationships between three models for describing pragmatic
response to utterances were surveyed and the application of these
models to young children's response patterns evaluated.

Of particular

interest was how children might discriminate action-directive and
information-testing usage of language.
In order to empirically test the validity of these models, sixteen
one- and two-year-old children were visited in their homes.

Each child

participated in two video recorded play sessions with an experimenter,
during which he or she was asked complex What-questions that could take
either informational or action responses.

Gestural accompaniments and

preceding discourse were systematically varied in Experiment I.

Each

child was also given the opportunity to respond to routine directive
and testing speech forms.

In Experiment II, the experimenter asked the

What-questions while the child was looking at irrelevant toys and again
while the child was looking at relevant pictures.
In Experiment I, children responded appropriately to the routine
speech forms, but treated complex What-questions as ambiguous.

Of

special interest, children often responded with answers which combined
iv

informational and directive interpretations.
Some aspects of context also affected responses to complex Whatquestions.

The presence of a gesture prompted responses which tend

towards nonverbal expression (orienting, acting).

The toy activity in

which a child was engaged affected the rate of action responding, but
did not affect other aspects of response.

The pragmatic function of

the discourse preceding target questions had no effect on children's
responses.
Two-year-olds gave more responses that combined or conflated
action and informing, and gave more simultaneous response combinations,
than did one-year-olds.

Two-year-olds, but not one-year-olds,

responded to the presence of a gesture by doubling their base rate of
responses which contain both action and informing.

The linguistic

sophistication of the child appeared to be less strongly related to
response than was chronological age.
These results indicate an early sensitivity to wording, and an
increasing ability to integrate linguistic and nonlinguistic sources of
information.

Overall, the results support a model in which children

are sensitive to both pragmatic structures and communicative cues.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In face-to-face discourse we often respond to conversational
events in ways which indicate that we have gone beyond, or have fallen
short of, the linguistic information inherent in the surface form of
a particular conversational utterance.

One of the ways in which

literal form may be exceeded or bypassed is in the derivation of
pragmatic function.

It has been a main argument of pragmatics and

speech act theory that utterances are used to do things in ways which
very often cannot be directly reduced to the information contained in
their vocabulary and grammar.

For example, "Can you pass the pepper?"

is literally an inquiry about one’s capability.

However, its prag

matic function is conventional in nature; it is commonly used and
perceived as request to pass the pepper.
At the very least, by school age, a child would be wise to
discern when a question such as " D ’ya wanna try it?" should be taken
as a sincere question, a directive, or a dare.

A critical issue in

the development of communicative skill, consequently, is how the child
comes to understand what is meant when the utterance can have more
than one pragmatic function.

While it is acknowledged that at school

age, most children's pragmatic knowledge is still limited in compari
son to that of adults (Ackerman-, 1978; Grimm, note 1), it has also been
argued that children attempt to use their communicative systems in
more than one way even from the very earliest stages of productive
communication skill (Bates, 1976; Halliday, 1973, 1975).

The specific
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concern here will be with how very young children respond to questions
which can take either of two very common pragmatic functions.

It is

these two functions— direction and testing— which underlie much of the
child's early conversational environment.

It is a valid question,

therefore, to ask whether or not the child distinguishes between these
two functions in speech directed to him or her, and how he or she
distinguishes them.
There exist two main models of pragmatics from which one may draw
hypotheses about pragmatic development, and one peripheral model which
has received little in the way of systematic attention.

These may be

termed the structural, strategic, and cue utilization models; it is to
these three models, and their unique theoretical concerns and predic
tions, that the remainder of this chapter is devoted.
The structural models
The primary motivation of structural models is the demonstration
and classification of intentionality as displayed in speech.

While

structural models are primarily models of competence, they can be used
to generate performance models which lend themselves to empirical veri
fication.
In the course of structural analyses of ordinary language use,
four classes of speech acts have been delineated.

Although termino

logy varies somewhat, these four classes can be called the explicit,
direct, conventional, and implied speech acts.

Because the processing

models differ somewhat for each of these speech act types, a brief
description and explanation of these classes follows.
Historically, the explcit performative was the first to be
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investigated.

Austin (19750, in his 1955 Willian James Lectures,

described situations in which a speaker accomplishes an act in a
rather explicit manner.

In such explicit performatives or speech

acts, structural linguistic cues (wording, verb choice) carry critical
information on the function of the utterance.

For example, a speaker

may say "I request that you pass me the salt".

While certain condi

tions must still be fulfilled in order for the act to be successful
and appropriate, the wording of such acts indexes the function of the
utterance in an explicit manner.
The second class of speech acts, the direct act, has received
little attention.

These are cases in which wording generally serves

as a direct, but not explicit, index of intent.

A prime example is

the imperative form, which is commonly used to convey a directive
intent without explicitly stating the intent in the utterance itself
(compare "Come here" with "I request that you come here").

Direct

forms are generally utterances which do not include the explicit
intention marker (e.g., "I order you to...", "I ask you...").

These

abbreviated forms are much more common in everyday language use than
explicit forms, which tend to be restricted to formal and ritualistic
situations.
The third class of speech acts, examined most extensively in the
philosophical literature by Searle (1975), can be called indirectconventional speech acts.

This class is comprised of utterances for

which a decontexted structural analysis of wording would lead an
investigator or responder to Function A, when in fact most native
speaker-hearers would select Function A*.

In these utterances, the
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function is made neither explicit nor direct, yet a function is readily
intended and conveyed, although in an indirect manner.

A popular

example is the utterance "Can you pass the salt?", when the utterance
functions not as an inquiry, but as a request.

Searle’s accomplishment

in the investigation of such speech acts was what amounted to a lin
guistic and philosophical 'proof' that these acts can express their
functions indirectly by virtue of a structured coordination between
linguistic meaning and the contextual conditions in which indirect
meanings are commonly conveyed.

Such indirect speech acts are con

ventional because they tend to be expressed in wordings commonly used
to convey given indirects meanings (e.g., "Can you...?").

Searle's

argument has been used as a blueprint for the construction of psycholo
gical processing models (e.g., Carrell, 1981; Clark & Lucy, 1975) in
which a responder derives a literal meaning for an indirect speech act
prior to transforming this meaning into a related, intended meaning.
In such a model, indirect meanings can be computed by a hearer if they
are expressed in conventional form (or a variant) with a structurally
supportive setting.
The fourth class of speech acts rests on the assumption that, in
addition to functional appropriateness conditions, all utterances must
fulfill a set of conditions of face-to-face conversations, termed
'conversational postulates'

(Grice, 1975).

Implied-nonconventional

speech acts, afe the term itself implies, are utterances which are not
explicit, direct, or conventional, yet for which functional assignments
and derivations can be made within contexts of use.

A typical example

is "It's ten o'clock"— a simple informing response in the case of a
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preceding request for information, but a directively-shaded warning to
a child who is dawdling over a bedtime snack.

It has been argued that,

as with conventional indirectives, a hearer first derives a literal
meaning and checks this functional meaning against the conditions of
use.

The original meaning is transformed through a logical process to

obtain a derived function.
No matter which class of speech acts is under consideration, all
structural models share four basic tenets:
speech serves can be classified into

(1) the functions that

a small number of

basic catego

ries of speech acts, (2) the wording, or form and content, of an
utterance indexes a literal meaning of that utterance which can be
associated with a primary pragmatic force, (3) the context of an
utterance can be characterized as fulfilling, or not fulfilling, a
relatively small set of conditions which determine the appropriateness
of this apparent primary force; these are generally termed ’felicity
conditions'; and (4) respondants can, in perceiving a mismatch between
primary force and the conditions of an utterance, engage in a process
of inductive and deductive reasoning which eventuates in a secondary
or derived force.
The first principle is not about to be challenged here.

Speech

does serve functions, whether or not active conversants consciously
classify the acts in which they engage.
here is that the two functions that

The only point to be made

will be investigated,

testing

and directing, belong to two different and discriminable categories of
speech acts and should be maximally distinct to any native speakerhearer.
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There is little discussion in pragmatics of how the second tenet,
the derivation of primary pragmatic meaning from wording, can be
realized in psychological processes.

That is, there is little under

standing how a function can be assigned on the basis of syntactic and
semantic information.

While it is assumed that speakers can convey

and hearers derive a functional speech act using wording as evidence,
our notions of how this may be accomplished are somewhat vague.

It

seems unfortunate that a theory predicated on a native speaker-hearer’s
ability to utilize wording has not clarified the parameters and pro
cesses associated with this capacity.

The capacity is taken largely

as a matter of faith, although there is some verification of its
existence in adults (Clark & Lucy, 1975) and school children (Carrell,
1981).

As will be seen later, strategic models have directly

challenged the utilization of wording in the derivation of pragmatic
meaning.

One of the issues addressed in the current research is

whether young children who are still struggling towards an understand
ing of grammar give any evidence of using wording patterns for the
derivation of a primary pragmatic force.
With regard to the third principle, the nature of the felicity
conditions is best conveyed by outlining the conditions which define
and confirm the two acts of directing and testing.
formulations are taken from Searle (1969, p. 66).
directive if and only i f :

The specific
A speech act is

(1) its propositional content is a potential

act to be performed by the hearer, (2) the hearer is capable of
executing that act, (3) the speaker believes that (2) is correct, (4)
it is not obvious to speaker and hearer that the hearer would perform
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the act without being directed to do so, (5) the speaker wants the
hearer to perform the act, (6) the speaker has the authority to direct
the hearer, and (7) the speaking of the utterance is an attempt to get
the hearer to perform the act.
different.

The defining conditions of a test are

An utterance is a test if and only if: (1) the speaker

wants to know if the hearer possesses information,

(2) it is not

obvious to speaker and hearer that the hearer would volunteer that
information without being asked, and (3) the speaking of the utterance
is an attempt to elicit the information from the hearer.

These lists

are not exhaustive, but do impart the general flavour of felicity
conditions.

They are not discrete, concrete events.

Instead, they

involve relatively abstract notions such as intentionality, capability,
and authority.

Structural models are the only models which emphasize

the role of formal contextual features in this manner.

This feature

has a corollary that contextual conditions that are not formal and
abstract have no place in a model of pragmatic competence.

This point

will become important in constrasting structural theories with other
available models.
The final tenet rests on the assertion that a competent speakerhearer is able to convey and derive speech acts through utterance forms
which are not direct and explicit.

None of the three pragmatic models

discussed here challenges this assertion.

It is the hallmark of

structural theory, however, that this is accomplished in a specifiable,
step-wise manner: (1) a primary force is conveyed or derived, using
the wording of an utterance,

(2) this force is matched against the

felicity conditions associated with that force, (3) if the primary
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force and the conditions match or confirm each other, the primary force
is considered accomplished, but (4) if they do not match, the exact
nature of the disagreement or mismatch can be used to retrieve or
construct the intended meaning.

The entire enterprise rests on the

structured interrelationship of wording, felicity conditions, and
human logic.
To reiterate a point, most theorists holding to a standard
structural model view themselves as engaged in linguistic-philosophical
inquiry.

Their concern is the elucidation of the structure of speech

acts and the characterization of an internally coherent model of
language competency.

As with structural models of grammar and cogni

tion, one can frequently observe a distinct aversion to the notion that
actual performance may not follow the dictates of coherency, logic, and
abstract principles.

In pursuit of elegance, the strategic and cue

utilization models argue, structural theory has failed to recognize the
dynamic and richly textured nature of people attempting to communicate.
The structural model makes rather extensive demands in terms of
linguistic and cognitive skills, both of which can be assumed to be in
the process of development in young children.

It remains somewhat

unclear, then, whether a structural model is at all appropriate for
children whose syntactic (Chomsky, 1969) and logical (Piaget, 1966)
development is far from complete.
The strategic models
Strategic models argue that the application of a structural system
to very young children is inappropriate on two counts.

First, toddlers

and preschoolers have too fragile a grasp of grammar for one to expect
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them to utilize wording for the derivation of primary force.

Secondly,

the young child does not possess the inductive and deductive logical
skills which would allow the derivation of a secondary or implied force,
even if a primary interpretation could be derived.
In place of a structural system, the dominant strategic model
(Shatz, 1978b) postulates that the child adapts

sensori-motor heuris

tics developed during infancy as strategies for responding to speech.
Since sensori-motor processes are heavily invested in direct action
on objects, the deployment of such strategies results in the child
responding to most speech as if it had a directive intent.

Development

away from this simple strategic system is viewed as gradual, and is not
complete even by the fourth year.

Over the course of the third year,

the child learns through direct experience that direct action
strategies do not always lead to acceptable responses and must be
inhibited in many circumstances.

The strategic model points to a set

of contextual cues which may serve to inhibit the tendency to act in
response to utterances.
Preceding

These are called stop-action markers.

discourse and the absence of toys upon which to act are two

cited examples of acquired stop-action markers.

In the absence of

such stop-action markers, children are still expected to revert to an
action strategy for responding to speech.
In short, the main point of strategic models is that there is
often little in the objective or logical conditions of a communication
which directly predicts a response.

Instead, the representative capa

city of the responding organism is the prime determinant of response.
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A strategic model is adept at explaining and predicting many
aspects of actual performance in communicative settings.

For example,

it clarifies why children may have no difficulty in responding to
mother's indirect wordings of directive forces (Shatz, 1978a).
However, there are reasons for dissatisfaction with its scope.

Shatz

(1979) has voiced the concern that children may indeed use wording,
although not in the way suggested by structural theory.

Allen and

Shatz (in press) have noted that the occurrence of action responses to
some questions varies widely amongst 16 - to 18-month-olds.

As best,

a simple strategic theory may not capture the complexity of the oneand two-year-old communicative response system.

Neither a structural

nor a strategic model seem completely adequate to the description of
young responders.
The cue utilization model
This model is based on the consideration that the majority of
everyday utterances are ambiguous in some regard, but that a speaker
will generally provide, and a hearer utilize, a variety of situational
and linguistic cues which indicate how an utterance should be inter
preted.

The factors that influence response to language are not con

fined to simple psychological heuristics or to the structured linguistic
and felicity conditions outlined by structural theory.

While these

latter may exert some influence on some responses, there are a number of
factors outside the purview of structural and strategic theory which
influence how the child or adult will respond to an utterance.
Historically, the model can be traced to Austin's (1975) stance
on 'primitive devices' in direct speech acts.

Austin described the
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following as some of the factors which can affect interpretation:
syntactic mood, tone of voice, grammatical particles, gestural accom
paniments, and circumstances of utterance.

It can readily been seen

that these factors or devices are more concrete than the wordingfunction relation and felicity conditions associated with the
structuralist model, functioning more like cues in a response cuing
paradigm (Orne, 1981).

These devices can be termed ’pro-force'markers.

The contrast with the structural model is best exemplifed by the
differing stances on the role of wording in interpretation.

Differing

sharply from the structuralist model, the cuing model makes a distinc
tion between routine (occasionally,

'idiomatic') and nonroutine forms.

Routine forms are syntactic constructions that are sociolinguistically
so closely tied to a particular function that meaning has become
'lexicalized'

(Cole, 1974; Sadock, 1972; c.f. Panther, 1981).

That is,

in encountering such a form, respondants have an immediate perception
of the intended meaning, and do not engage in the elaborate inferences
invoked by the structuralist system.

An adult participant may choose

to conduct a structural analysis, but this is not generally the case
for natural interaction, and is probably beyond the capacity of a small
child under any circumstance.

Lexicalization would be learned from

concentrated exposure to form-function redundancies (Shatz, 1979), and
evidence for the lexicalization effects of parental language routines
has been presented by Allen and Shatz (in press).
Nonroutine, less common forms are those constructions whose
wording does not directly carry a functional import.

These forms are

considered to be more ambiguous than routine forms, eliciting the
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derivation of function through sensitivity to contextual cues.
Responses to nonroutine forms, then, are expected to vary according to
various aspects of context.
Now, what contexts?

Allen and Shatz (in press) argue that

gestural accompaniments of questions increase some kinds of nonverballyexpressed response, but do not affect vocal responses.

There is

evidence from other sources (e.g., Murphy & Messer, 1977) that children
will orient to gestures, but that the gestural response
complete by late infancy.

system is not

It would seem, then, that gesture is one

aspect of context that affects response (however fortuitously in a
structuralist’s eye), but that its effect may be limited to nonverbal
components of replies and that its role may change over age.
The toy and activity with which a question is associated may
affect response, but the data are not entirely consistent here.

Bruner

and co-workers (Ninio & Bruner, 1978; Ratner & Bruner, 1978) have
argued that some activities are developed by parents into scripted
routines into which a child gradually learns to insert appropriate
responses.

Certain types of activities (e.g., book reading), then,

should be used as cues for the production of functionally tailored
responses.

However, children do not always discriminate between

picture and action toy activities in their responses (Allen & Shatz,
in press).

More research will be necessary in order to clarify the

relationship between activity context and responses to questions.
There are certain affinites between the strategic and cue utilize"
tion models.

Both are concerned with a characterization of actual

performance in face-to-face interaction.

Both argue that the linguistic
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and cognitive demands of a structural model exceed the capacities of
language-leamers.

In lieu of sophisticated analytic processes,

children in interaction are considered to possess alternative means
for governing their participation.

The models concur that interaction

systems must incorporate contextual cues to pragmatic force, and that

these cues are learned in the context of parent-child discourse.

The

disagreement, therefore, is not on a philosophical or paradigmatic
level.
The disagreement is over what the response system jjLis.

The

strategic model formulates a system wherein the primary response
impulse is towards action and development is the accumulation of stopaction markers.

The cuing model proposes a system in which pro-force

markers are gradually acquired, transformed, and integrated.

In the

strategic model, the child is constantly acting in response to
language, unless he or she is confronted with evidence that this is
inappropriate.

In the cue utilization model, a conversational

participant is perceived as constantly scanning for indicators of how
a message should be taken.
Three models for the perception of pragmatic force
We have just surveyed three models for how a member of a speech
community might be able to respond to conversation in ways which are
not reducible to his or her grammatical understanding.

The first

model is structural in nature, with an emphasis on a linguistic/
cognitive analysis of the utterance and certain aspects of its
issuance.

The second argues for the existence of a response strategy,

with a gradual accretion of contextual and linguistic markers which
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inhibit the deployment of this heuristic.

The final model emphasizes

early sensitivity to discrete pro-force markers, with continuing
development and integration of functional cues.
These three models have been framed as
communication.

competing

theories of

But given that development occurs, it is possible that

one model may be appropriate for communicative interaction at one age,
while a different model may best characterize interaction at a further
point in development.

The question addressed here, then, is not which

theory is the best pragmatic theory, but which model is appropriate for
children in the age range of one to two years.

Theoretical qualifica

tions about the appropriateness of a structural model have been voiced
above, and indeed some evidence has been presented against this model
in the age range of one to three years (Shatz, 1978b).

But similarly,

the main proponent of a strategic model has remarked first of all that
the action strategy may be partially outgrown by this period (Shatz,
1978b) or may not be applicable at all (Shatz, 1979).

The problem

with the cue utilization model is that although we may know more than
Austin did when he wrote his treatise on pragmatics, we may still
safely say that we have no theory about which objective conversational
cues are linked to which pattern of assigned meaning.
In the following experiments, three sources of possible pragmatic
variation are manipulated in an attempt

to evaluate

the

applica

bility of the three response models to one-and two-year-old children.
These are wording of stimulus utterance, context of stimulus utterance,
and age/linguistic skill of responder.
For the manipulation of wording, children are presented with
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three syntactic frames which are very common in parental speech
(imperatives, "Can you...?", "What's this?") and one which is less
common (complex What-questions).

Each of the three models makes

unique predictions of the dominant response to each utterance type.
In addition, the complex What-questions will be presented to
children while a set of candidate contextual cues are varied.

The

contextual conditions are preceding discourse (directive, informative,
neutral), gesture (points, no gesture) and toy activity (play with
appropriate toys, play with question-irrelevant toys, looking at
pictures).
The children who respond to these utterances are drawn from two
different age groups: one and two years.

These children are expected

to manifest a range of expressive language skill.

Thus, we may be

able to determine the type of trajectory of any developmental changes
in response pattern, and whether such changes are more closely related
to age or linguistic skill.
Because some model predictions require knowledge of who the
responders are, and what their pragmatic experience has been, there
will be an attempt to characterize some aspects of these children's
pragmatic environment (parental question usage) and their general
communicative skill or linguistic status.

For this reason, the

presentation of specific hypotheses is postponed to Chapter III.
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II. METHOD

This investigation consists of three separate methodologies— one
experiment which manipulated minor contextual accompaniments and
wording variations of messages within a naturalistic format, a second
which varied the gross circumstances of target question presentation,
and nonexperimental settings which afforded the collection of informa
tion on child language skill and parent-child communication.

Experiment I

Experiment I investigated the role of minor contextual cues in
children's responses to What-questions presented in a semi-structured
play session.

Subjects.

Subjects were 16 children aged 17 to 28 months.

The

one-year-old group consisted of four boys and four girls of ages 17 to
21 months; the two-year-old group contained four boys and four girls
aged 24-28 months.

All children were from middle class families

contacted on an individual basis.

Two of the children in the younger

group were first-borns, as were five of the children in the older group.
The remaining children had between one and four older siblings at home.
All families used English as the primary language in the home, although
six children in the sample had had substantial exposure to a second
language.

The only language development criterion for entry in the

study was that the child have at least five English words in the
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productive lexicon— words which the mother could identify.

Families

were not reimbursed for participation.

Materials (toy sets).

Three toy sets were used for the experimen

tal sessions— a doll, house, and barn set.
a rag doll with extra clothing.

The doll set consisted of

The clothing was intermediate in size

between that normally required for the doll and that appropriate for a
small child (i.e., baby clothes).
socks, and mittens.

These items were a hat, slippers,

A toy truck large enough to seat a small child

was included for some children; a small foam ball, a small tea set,
and a small set of realistic plastic fruit were included for all
children.
The house was a standard Fisher-Price doll house.

The set of

furniture and dolls which normally comes with the set, however, was
reduced in number to avoid distraction.

A small foam ball and a set

of minature plastic fruit were included in the set.
The barn was a Fisher-Price barn and animal set.
a tractor trailer, doll people, and fencing material.

The set includes
The set of

people and the peripheral materials (e.g., horse harness) was reduced,
again to avoid distraction.

A small foam ball, a wooden tree, a small

woolen bird, and minature plastic fruit were added to the set to expand
the actions available to the child.
These toy sets were assembled so that children would have the
opportunity to give appropriate action responses to all target questions
asked during play.

For example, embedding the question "What do you

wear on your head?" in the doll set allows the child to respond by
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trying to put on the hat from the set.

At the same time, a sufficient

variety of toys was included to ensure that a child had several dis
tinctively different actions available at any given time.

Order of

toy set presentation was determined randomly for each child.

Materials (target questions).

Target questions were What-

questions with two to three basic semantic object-units.

They were

identified from pilot work as being used by mothers as direct test
questions.

However, they can also imply in a nonconventional manner

that an action be performed.

For example, "What do you do with a

truck?" is directly used to elicit the verbal response "Drive" or
"Ride", but children can interpret it as a request to play with the
toy truck in an appropriate manner.
Table 1 presents the target questions used in both Experiment I
and Experiment II.

The question frames are presented with the lexical

items which were substituted into them.

Each child heard only two

wordings of each frame, with the particular lexical items determined
on a random basis for each child.

In this way, a particular child

heard two questions from each frame several times but he did not
necessarily hear the same wordings as any other child.

Questions were

distributed evenly among the relevant toy sets and randomized, within
certain sequencing constraits, for order of presentation.

Constraints

were that no more than two identical contextual conditions be allowed
to follow each other, and that no more than two identical phrasings be
allowed to follow each other.
the clustering of cues in time.

This constraint was formulated to avoid
As an example, it was considered
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Table 1

Target questions for Experiments I & II

1.

What

2.

What

1
do you
T wear on your/its
1 does a dolly f

X
V,

lives
goes

does
does

{

do

{

do
does

\

in a

J

baby "j
a cat r
you

/ hands
4 head V ?
I feet J

J house I* ?
^ barn

I

do/eat

?

J

you "I
dolly J

do with a

f banana"\
< ball h
car

J

?
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necessary to avoid the succession of three or four directive settings
in case the child construct a generalized expectancy for directive
discourse.

Materials (nontarget events).

With each toy set, each child was

presented once with the following nontarget stimuli.
-"What's that?"

accompained by point at object

-imperative form of a target question (e.g., "Put
the bird in the tree")
-"Can you" form of a target question (e.g., "Can
you eat the apple?")
On approximately half the occasions, the imperatives and "Can you”
questions were accompained by a pointing gesture directed at one of
the referents of the utterance.
All nontarget stimuli were randomized with target questions for
placement within a toy set.

Each child was asked to respond to 16

target wordings and three nontarget stimuli in each 15 minute toy set
activity.
The "What's this?" stimuli determine how children respond to
another direct test question.

The last two events are a direct and a

conventional directive, and hence should be responded to by action if
children are attending to linguistic cues.

Experimental design.

The two contextual conditions, preceding

discourse and gesture, were factorially manipulated, yielding a split
plot design.

The general design is schematized in Table 2.

Since

each question was asked under all condition, eight responses per
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Table 2

General design of Experiment X

Contextual Manipulations

Directive Set

Gesture

NoGest*

Informational Set

Gesture

NoGest*

Neutral Set

Gesture

Younger
Group
(n=8)

Older
Group
(n=8)

*NoGest = questions were not accompanied by gestures.

NoGest*
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condition type (i.e., eight target wordings) or 48 target data points
in total were obtained for each child.

Each nontarget stimulus, not

represented in Table 2, was offered a total of three times for each
child.
Discourse set is determined by a two-utterance sequence which
precedes each target question.

Both directive and informational sets

exhibited some topic coherency with the target questions in that they
concerned related members of the toy set without mentioning the actual
toy indicated by the question itself.

Directive discourse sets con

sisted of imperative frames aimed at involving child in action with
the toys available.

Info.rmational sets were active declarative

utterances aimed at involving the child in orienting to or talking
about, but not touching, the toys.

Examples of a target question

preceded by its directive and informational sets follow:
Informational

All these clothes are for the dolly.
She wears shoes and mittens.
What does a dolly wear on her head?

Directive

Here, put the mittens on dolly.
Now put on the socks.
What does a dolly wear on her head?

The third discourse set was not a series, but the experimenter asked
the target question after a pause of approximately one minute since
the last utterance.

This was termed the ’neutral1 setting, although

it should be cautioned that it is not so much a neutral as a 'childdetermined ' setting.
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In order to study the effects of gestural accompaniments of
questions, target questions were presented under two gestural condi
tions— gestured and no gesture.

In the gestured condition, questions

were asked while the experimenter pointed at the object whose name is
the answer to the question (frames 1, 2, & 3) or the object of the
question (frames 3 & 4).

For an example of how preceding discourse

and gesture combine, a child presented with a gestured directive
question will hear;
Make the dolly sit.
Give her the apple*
What do you do with a banana? (E points to banana)
In the no gesture condition, questions were asked without accompanying
gestures.

General procedure.

Prior to the experiment, all children were

visited in their homes by the experimenter.

Mothers of subjects were

informed that their children were to participate in a study of communi
cative development, and were given an estimate of how many visits the
study should entail (2—3) and how long the average visit should last
(1-1% hours).

They were asked to complete a language assessment scale,

and a short mother-child play session was audio recorded (see below),
Up to two weeks later, the experimenter returned with video
equipment and toys.
felt at ease.

The equipment was set up and left until the child

As soon as the child began to ignore the equipment, the

mother was asked to play or conduct some other normal activity (e.g.,
snack time, looking at books) of her own selection.

After a five-
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minute taping of this session, she was asked to sit back or alongside
of the child while the experimenter played with and talked to the
child.

She was requested not to interrupt unless she felt the session

should be terminated.
The experimenter then played and conversed as naturally as
possible with the child, embedding the target sequences and nontarget
events in filler conversation.

The target sequences were timed so

that they fell evenly among already instigated action activities,
looking and talking activities, and pauses, regardless of the discourse
set type.

However, such timing was not rigidly controlled, as not all

children evenly distributed their activities among these three basic
possibilities.

After all target questions for a toy set had been

asked, the toys were replaced with the next set if the child was
considered ready.

A toy set was removed if the child ignored five

consecutive target items, and tried again at a later point in time.
The day's procedure was completed at the mother's suggestion or when
the child appeared to be uncooperative and tired.
completed two toy sets in one half-hour sitting.
testing was necessary for a majority of children.

Most children
A second day of
The same procedure

was used on the second day, with a brief parent-child taping (when
time allowed) followed by the experimental procedure.

The overall

structure of the Experiment I interactional setting was designed to
mimic a normal adult-child play session as closely as possible.

The

general procedure, including Experiment II (see below), is outlined in
Table 3.
There were a few variations from the outlined procedure.

Two

Table 3

Outline of Procedure

Day 1

Day 2

Day 3

Familiarization with family
(30 minutes)

Equipment set-up and waiting
period (15-45 minutes)

Equipment set-up and
waiting period
(15-30 minutes)

Completion of REEL and
lexicon count (30
minutes)

Parent-child activitity (video,
5-8 minutes)

Parent-child activity
(video, 4 minutes)

Parent-child activity
(audio, 15-25 minutes)

Experiment I, first two toy
sets (video, 20-25
minutes)

Experiment I, remaining
toy set (video, 1015 minutes)
Experiment II (video,
10-15 minutes)
Debriefing interview
(audio, 20-25 minutes)
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There were a few variations from the outlined procedure.

Two

children in the older group completed the entire procedure on Day 2.
For these children, the second video taped parent-child activity was
deleted.

A few children also completed Experiment I on Day 2.

For

these children, the video taped visit eliminated the second parentchild activity.

Hence, a second recorded activity was obtained for

only nine children.

One two-year-old repeated part of an Experiment I

toy set after Experiment II on Day 3, due to data missing from Day 2
collection.

Experiment II

Experiment II was designed to assess the impact of changes in
the activity circumstances of target questions.

The overall structure

of the experiment was rather different from that of Experiment I in
that the situation did not mimic a normal play session.

Experiment I

constituted a rather normal play activity in that a variety of toys
was present, the child and experimenter engaged in normally-paced
play-directed talk, and the questions asked of the child could be
deemed to concern relevant toy-play and toy-talk.

In contrast,

Experiment II utilized only one or two toys at a time, was rather
quickly-paced, and was planned to reduce the amount of preceding con
versation.

Experiment II was designed to highlight a contrast between

orientation to a relevant picture and orientation to an irrelevant
toy at the time a question is asked.
comparisons are afforded:

Using this structure, several

overall circumstances (Experiment I vs.

Experiment II), type of object in focal attention (pictures of
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Experiment II vs. toys of Experiments I and II), relevance of question
to object (toys of Experiment II vs. pictures of Experiment II and
toys of Experiment I).

Subjects.

The same subjects who participated in Experiment I

were utilized for Experiment II.

Materials (toy set).
for use in the experiment.

Several small toy packages were constructed
Each pack contained one or two small,

simple action toys (e.g., small foam ball) and a sturdy picture taken
from a baby book.

The picture in each package illustrated in a very

obvious way the answer to the target question associated with that
package.

For example, the picture for "What do you do with an apple?"

depicted a small child eating an apple.

In contrast, the toy in each

package was not appropriate to the target question associated with it.
However, the toy did provide the child with the opportunity to panto
mime or act out an action appropriate to the question, using the toy
as a prop.

But in order to do so, the child would have to override

the 'conventional' action potential of the toy.

To extend the previous

example, there was a small foam ball which the child could pretend to
eat in place of an apple.

Materials (target questions).

As with Experiment I, the target

questions were generated from Table 1.

Each child heard two wordings

from each frame, but the lexical items were different from the specific
lexical items that individual child heard in Experiment I,

Each child

therefore heard eight individual target wordings in Experiment II,
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each associated with its own toy package.

General design.

After eight toy packages had been selected for

each child, these were randomized for order of presentation.

In the

course of Experiment II, each question was asked twice in conjunction
with its package.

It was asked once while the child was looking at

the picture, and once while he or she was looking at the toy.
were called Pictures II and Toys II conditions respectively.

These
The

design resulted in 16 data points for each child, eight in each
condition.

Procedure.

In every case, Experiment II followed Experiment I

(see Table 3), but for some children it occurred on a separate and
final day of testing.

The rationale for this relative placement was

to avoid breaking the day-to-day appearance set for Experiment I.
At the beginning of Experiment II, each child was asked to "Come
see what I have in this bag".

The child was allowed to open the bag

and remove the picture and/or toy.

As soon as the child focused on

one of the items, the question assigned to that package was asked.
After attention had switched spontaneously to the other item, the
question was repeated.

When the question had been asked for both

picture and toy, the items were replaced in the package and the child
offered the next package in the series.

The experimenter was instruc

ted to present all questions without gestures and without preceding
conversation.

Experiment II generally required 15 minutes per child,

and involved a rather quick progression from package to package
(approximately one package every 2 minutes).

In all cases, toys (T)
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and pictures. (P) were presented in a counterbalanced order of
TPPTTPPT....

That is, if a child spontaneously removed a toy first

for the initial package, he or she was next offered the picture,
followed by the picture from the next package, and so on.

Parent and Child Baselines

Several sources of information were gathered on the communicational styles of parents, the questioning pattern of parents, and the
linguistic capabilities and performance of the children involved in
the sample.

Parental discourse.
styles were obtained:

Three sources of data on parental discourse

audiotaped conversation, video taped play

sessions, and a debriefing interview.
actual usage and performance.

The first two yielded data on

The last yielded predominantly verbal

self-reports of usage and the occasional datum pertaining to actual
usage.
For the last 15-25 minutes of the first one-hour visit to the
home, a portable cassette recorder was placed in the vicinity of
parent and child, and the parent instructed to continue or shift to
a parent-child activity of choice while the interaction was audio
recorded for later analysis.

This recording was later transcribed,

and the parent's remarks coded for apparent pragmatic function, using
Shatz's (1979) scheme.

As only verbal information (wording and tone

of voice) was available, only relatively unambiguous cases were coded
for function.

All parental remarks were subsequently classified as

30

questions or nonquestions by syntactic and

intonational

criteria.

Questions were then identified as either What/Who-questions or other
questions,

(yes/no, other wh-).

Ratios were computed for What-

questions to questions, questions to utterances, and What-questions to
utterances.
Parents were also video recorded in an activity of their choice
with their children for five to eight minutes before the beginning of
Experiment I.

For a few children, an additional four minutes of video

recorded interaction was obtained prior to Experiment II on the second
day of video taping.

Complete transcripts of verbal and nonverbal

behavior were compiled from these recordings.
ratios were computed as above.

Question-utterance

All What/Who-questions produced by a

parent were identified from the transcript, their gestural accompani
ments noted, and a pragmatic function assigned.
During the transcription of the final audio recorded debriefing
interview, any child-directed remarks made by the parent were noted.
From these remarks, an additional set of question-utterance ratios was
computed.

Discourse functions were assigned to all What-questions

identified.
During the interview, each parent was asked several questions
about his or her usage of questions, and of What-questions in particu
lar.

They were asked first what kinds of questions they thought that

they normally asked their children, and about the activities that
these questions accompanied.

They were requested to report any

routines or games which regularly accompanied their questions.

If

such information was not volunteered, they were asked if they were
aware of using any of the target questions and, if so, whether the
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questions: commonly occurred in any games, or routines.

Parent's

responses were transcribed and coded as self-reports of question usage.
The full interview is presented in Appendix A.
The available transcripts of parent-child talk were thus used in
the following manner:

(1) to give an estimate of the frequency of

What-questions in parental talk addressed to the child, (2) to deter
mine whether children had had exposure to both testing and directive
functions in discourse,

(3) to determine whether children had had

exposure to variants of the target questions used in the current
experiments,

(4) to identify the pragmatic functions carried by What-

questions and variants of target forms in this sample, and (5) to
identify any candidates for 'routine' What-questions among these
mother-child dyads.

The main purpose was to determine whether or not

forms like the target questions were in fact used as direct test
questions by the parents in this sample.

Child language measures.

Several sources were used to estimate

the linguistic capacities and skills of the children involved in the
experiments.

The parent-child transcripts described above were used

for computing a mean length of utterance (MLU) in words and in
morphemes for each child.

Vocabulary counts were also computed from

these transcripts, and expanded by asking the parents to list the
contents of the child's productive lexicon.

Parents were also asked

specifically if their children were known to use the content words of
the target questions and their canonical answers (e.g., "apple",
"eat"); these words were added to the lexicon count if a parent
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reported that the child used these words spontaneously.
On the first visit, parents and experimenter also completed the
REEL, an age-graded scale based on parental reports and direct observa
tions of both productive/expressive language use and comprehension/
receptive skills (Bzoch & League, 1971).

This results in an expressive

and a receptive language age (in months) assigned to each child.
Parents were also asked, in the final visit, if they thought that
their children understood each of the target questions, regardless of
whether the child had responded correctly in the course of the experi
ments.

These reports, in combination with a consideration of lexicon

contents, were used to classify children into groups which could be
expected to answer questions correctly or not.
The characterization of each child’s linguistic skill therefore
consisted of the following independent measures:
language skill as indexed by MLU,

(1) productive

(2) productive language skill as

indexed by expressive score on REEL, (3) receptive language skill as
indexed by receptive score on REEL, and (4) question-specific skills
as indexed in parental reports.

The Coding Scheme

The response code is concerned exclusively with the apparent
function of the child’s response.

Theoretically, the function of a

response is independent of form and content, although in practice
there may be considerable overlap or redundancy.

The primary func

tional distinction for the stimuli used here is that between action and
informing— the child can make a response which indicates that he

33

perceived either a directive or an informational intent in the stimu
lus item and its presentation.
The aim of the code was to classify responses to all stimulus
types (i.e., both targets and nontargets).

Thus all responses to

experimental stimuli were classified as belonging to the following
functional types, according to their apparent pragmatic function.
Interrater reliabilities are summarized in Table 4.

All responses to

Experiment I and II target questions, and to "What's this?" nontargets,
emitted by one child from each age-sex group were coded independently
by two raters (one of whom coded the remaining 12 children).

Responses

were originally classified by form and response channel (verbal, non
verbal, both), and collapsed into the categories listed below.
Disagreements between raters were resolved by discussion and review of
the videotaped response.

Ambiguities in collapsing data into the

functional categories outlined below were similarly resolved by
reviewing the video record.

The coding scheme is borrowed from Shatz

(1978a), with the addition of the conflated and reference categories.
As will be expanded below, the first four classes are considered
appropriate or meaningful functional types for target questions.
(1)

Simple informing— This indicates that the child perceived the

event as requiring the designation of information.

Predominantly,

these are verbal responses, but may include nonverbal informing
(indications such as pointing, showing).

Also included are yes/no

responses such as "I don't know", shrugs, and certain other kinds of
verbal response (e.g., simple verbal deixis, verbal evasions)
classified as simple informing if they indicated that the child seemed
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Table 4

Interrater Reliability for the Coding Scheme

Index

Significance

po

Kappa

Pe

s.e. o(k)

z

P

.921

.680

.756

.026

26.15

.0001

NVBL only......

.891

.538

.766

VBL

.881

.578

.718

Dual Channel....

.780

.556

.504

Overall.........

.724

.565

.366

.038

14.87

.0001

Action..........

.868

.738

.497

Orientation....

.783

.584

.478

Indication.....

.929

.489

.861

Overall.........

.695

.537

.298

.087

6.17

.0001

Category

Presence
of Response...

CHANNEL

only......

NVBL TYPES

NVBL = nonverbal modality
VBL = verbal

modality
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to believe that an informing answer was the appropriate response.

Not

all verbal remarks following a stimulus were counted as simple
informing responses.

Some remarks were simple accompaniments or post

ponements of action responses (e.g., "What does dolly eat?"— Child
feeds doll and says "Yum-yum"), and hence were not coded as simple
informing.

Only informing responses without responsive nonverbal

orientation or action were coded as 'simple informing'.

Those verbal

informing responses accompanied by orienting responses were classified
as 'reference'

(see below); those which occurred with an action were

coded as 'conflated'

(see below).

A simple informing response is one

which reflects a simple informational function without action or
orientation components.

It is the appropriate response to target

questions by structural criteria.
(2) Reference— The child offers a verbal response which is judged
to conform to an informational intent and that response is accompanied
by a discrete orienting response to some object in such a manner that
both the verbal and orientation components appear to be integral to
the response.

This category includes verbal imitations or unclear

verbal remarks accompanied by orienting responses in cases where the
child appears to be using the utterance to name or reference the
object to which he or she orients.

Since reference necessarily

includes orienting to some object, it may indicate a perception that a
a question is deictic in nature.
(3) Conflation— The response contains a conflation of action and
informing.

Here, 'conflation' is used in the linguistic sense to

indicate that the child fuses two different responses in one response
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slot.

That is, the response contains both an action response and an

informing component.

The child appears to recognize that the question

has both a directive and testing force.

The two components need not

be simultaneous, but both should follow the question quickly enough
to be considered as true responses.

Relative onsets of action and

informing components were recorded.
(4) Simple action— generally, the response is nonverbal only,
with the child performing some action which indicates that he or she
perceived a directive force.

The response may include an initial

orientation if the action follows shortly; it may not include a verbal
response which indicates that an informational force was also per
ceived.

It may, however, be accompanied or indexed by a verbal

response which supports an action interpretation (e.g., "What does
dolly eat?"— Child says "Wait a minute.

I hafta cook.").

Simple

action responses to targets are predicted by a strategic model.
The above four classes are standard response types.

A cuing

model considers all as functionally appropriate for target questions,
given the pragmatic ambiguity of these questions.

In contrast, they

are not equally appropriate to nontarget stimuli.

Only simple acting,

for example, is appropriate for imperative stimuli.

In addition to

these standard types, there are three classes of responses which are
not clearly appropriate.

An outline of these responses is set out

below.
(5) Simple orienting— The only response of the child is to shift
visual orientation to some object, apparently in response to either
question or gesture.

In cases where the child had been oriented

37

towards the object concerned before the stimulus presentation, touching
or picking up of that object is coded as simple orienting.

Cases in

which looking is established prior to the stimulus, and continues
without change, is not coded as simple orienting (see ambiguous
responses, below).

The orienting response, in order to be counted as

simple, is not extended by action, nonverbal indication or verbal
response.

Simple orientations, although not standard responses, were

counted as 'codable' for some analyses, as they are considered as
meaningful pragmatic responses in the cue utilization literature.
(6) Ignoring— The child offers no response whatsoever to the
stimulus.

On these occasions, the child was judged as giving no clear

evidence of having

heard an utterance or seen a gesture.

(7) Ambiguous— The response is too ambiguous in some way to
count as a meaningful response.

For example, a behavior occurred, but

the coder felt that its status as a response to the question or
gesture was highly uncertain and did not warrant
the above types.

inclusion

as any of

Another instance is when the behavior which occurred

in the response slot was not sufficiently well articulated to allow
unambiguous classification as a particular functional type.

For

example, the child appeared to perform some action, but his or her
back to the camera blocked the coder's view and made accurate
ascertainment impossible.

The remaining ambiguous types were: an

unintelligible verbal response without accompanying disambiguating
behavior, visual search of toy space or room without discrete termina
tion, verbal request for clarification which is not followed by
further response, confused or blank look, staring or continued
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nonresponsive orientation, and functionally inappropriate verbal or
nonverbal behavior which nonetheless appeared to be provoked or
elicited by the stimulus.

Each of these particular subtypes was of

very low frequency (3 to 20 cases of each type out of 768 target
questions).

All responses in this category reflect a lack of prag

matic clarity on the part of either the coder or the child.
some analyses, ambiguous responses

For

were combined with ignorings

into a class of 'noncodable response' due to (a) low frequencies and
(b) lack of any theoretical distinction between these two types for
a distributional analysis.
For some post hoc analyses involving target and nontarget
stimuli, various codable categories can also be combined.

Simple

informing, reference and conflated responses can be combined to yield
a general informational index— the overall propensity to offer an
informational response component.

Simple action and conflated

responses can be combined for a general action index.
procedure has been employed by Clark' (1979).

A similar

In addition, reference

and simple orientation responses can yield an index of general
orientation.
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III. TAILORING HYPOTHESES

Before any discussion of children's responses to experimental
stimuli, it is necessary to consider the types of communicative exper
ience these children have had, and their basic communicative skill as
indexed by a variety of measures.

This is especially the case since

information about experience and skill is needed to state specific
hypotheses relevant to the three models of communicative response.
Hence, what follows is the specification of hypotheses for this sample
of children.
While general expectancies about children's responses can be
generated by the structural, strategic, and cue utilization models,
these expectancies can be modified considerably by knowledge of the
specific subject group which is offering the responses.

There are two

sources of information which will prove relevant to the fine tuning of
hypotheses:

parental language usage and child language level.

Parental Usage and Reports of What-Questions

A perusal of the available parent-child transcripts indicated that
over half the sample of children has had substantial experience with
the two discourse functions which the target questions could express.
This does not necessarily indicate, however, that these children have
had experience with What-questions or would be expected to associate
What-questions with these two functions.
The corpus of parental speech to children totalled 4,082

40

utterances.

Within the fixed 5-minute video session, a mean of 115.9

utterances was collected from each parent (SD = 36.26), or 23 utterances
per minute.

This talkativeness was manifest across a variety of
*

activities of choice— from feeding the child to looking through books or
albums.

From the entire corpus of utterances, 563 What/Who-questions

were identified, or 35.3 per parent (over approximately one hour of data
collection).

Variability in the frequency of What/Who-questions,

however, was high (SD = 29.93).

Over all transcripts, the proportion

of questions to utterances was .39, with a range from .15 to .64 (SD =
.13); the proportion of What/Who-questions to questions was .30, with a
range of .10 to .54 (SD = .14); the proportion of What/Who questions to
parental utterances was .12, range .02 to .25 (SD = .08).

Because not

all parents were video taped during the final visit, and because not
all parents addressed speech to their children during the interview, it
was not possible to statistically evaluate the effect of data source on
these proportions.

However, the proportions do not appear to change

substantially across the four sequential sources.

The questions/

utterances proportions are .44, .34, .41, and .32 for the four succes
sive situations.

The What/questions proportions are .30, .29, .25, and

.25; the What/utterances proportions are .13, .11, .10, and .17.

In

summary, the relative rates of What/Who-questions in particular and
questions in general seem to reflect a phenomenon which is relatively
stable across the observed conditions, but which shows moderate to
high variability across parent-child dyads.

While all children have

had some exposure to What-questions, the extent of the exposure would
seem to vary considerably.

All ratios and talkativeness are higher
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than those reported for Hardy-Brown, Plomin and DeFries's (1981) sample,
and the questions/utterances ratio is higher than that reported for
Lucariello and Nelson's (note 2) sample.
What/Who-questions were overwhelmingly used as test questions by
all parents of older children (X = 70% of all What/Who-questions).
Testing was also a common function of What/Who-questions for all
parents of younger children, although at a significantly lower rate,
X = 59%,

(14) = 5.00,

jd

<.01.

In contrast, parents rarely used What-

and Who-questions to express the directive function, X = 2.1% of What/
Who's.

Parents appear to use the What-questions format as a direct

test.
What-forms are not evenly distributed across syntactic subtypes.
Over one-third of all What/Who-questions (X = 34%) were of the routine
form "Who/What's this?".

Variants of target questions accounted for

12% of all What/Who-forms.

The remaining 54% of the What/Who-questions

demonstrated no particular syntactic pattern, although some parents
used a simple "What?" as a request for clarification.
Eleven of the sixteen parents were observed to use variants of one
or more target frames.

Most target variants were used as tests (37 of

the 47 target variants).

This indicates that these children, when they

have had exposure to target forms, have had this exposure under condi
tions where they are expected to offer informational responses rather
than action.

As mentioned previously, this seems to be true of What-

questions in general.

Most parental target variants were in fact

worded so as to preclude a test/directive ambiguity.

Commonly, a

variant was inflected as present progressive (e.g., "What are those
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little tigers wearing on their heads?") or past tense (e.g., "What did
you do?").

These grammatical inflections follow from situations

wherein directive interpretations were unsupported in any case (e.g.,
looking through a book).

However, at least two instances of each

target frame were observed in functionally ambiguous wordings.

Some

samples of parental usage follow:
Frame 1— What do you wear on your head?
Frame 2— Who goes in the tractor?
Frame 3— What'd you do?
Frame 4— An' whaddaya do with the money?
In the 17 cases like those above, 11 of the questions were used as
tests, 4 were used as directives and one was indeterminate for test/
directive.

The remaining case served as an attempt to elicit informa

tion not possessed by the parent.
Only two parents reported using a target form in a regular game
or routine.

A mother of a younger boy remarked "I say, you know,

goes here? ...with puzzle pieces."

Her "What goes

What

here?" would be

considered a variant of frame 2 as its surface form is functionally
ambiguous (test/directive).

A mother of an older girl offered as a

common interaction "If we're involved in eating breakfast, I'll ask her
What

are

fast?."

you eating for breakfast?

or

What do you want for break

Although the precise wording of these target variants biases

towards a testing and floor offer function, the response requirements
are close to those of target frame 3.

Eleven of the other parents

reported nontarget What-question routines, predominantly "What's this?"
quizzes.

While most of the children thus appear to have had some
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exposure to target forms, only two of the 16 are likely to have had
any concentrated experience.

The relevance of parental usage

These results allow the fine-tuning of hypotheses about responses
to target questions.

Since parents use target forms as direct tests,

structural theory would predict that children should offer informing
responses to these forms when presented under felicitous conditions.
That is, children should deal with targets as direct speech acts, and
not as conventional or implied acts which warrant the computation of
derived meaning(s).
The relevance of this pattern for the strategic model is not clear.
Stop-action markers are learned from experience, and "What...?" has
been suggested as such a marker.

However, the parameters of stop-action

learning have not been established, so it is not possible to state that
the "What"-testing association should abort the action strategy.

A

strong stance would be that "What...?" is not such a marker, and should
not prevent children from executing action responses to target ques
tions.
The predictions of a cuing model rest on the distinction between
routine and nonroutine forms.

While they are direct tests, target

forms were not used as conversational routines, except by two parents.
For the group as a whole, then, a cuing model would not predict any
consistent response pattern.

Instead, a scatter of meaningful and

nonmeaningful responses is expected, with a very slightly raised
probability of informing-class responses.

This should stand in strong
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distinction to the reference responses predicted for the routine
"What's this?" form.
The three models, then, make unique predictions about the dominant
function of the responses to target forms, given information on parental
usage.

The structural model argues in favor of informing responses; the

strategic model predicts a high proportion of action responses; the cue
utilization model predicts a scatter of responses, with the possibility
of a slight advantage to informing types of response.

Children's Linguistic Status

The children in this sample were assessed during the initial visit
and subsequent parent-child interactions on three main language dimen
sions— receptive ability (RLA, or receptive language age on the REEL
scale), general expressive ability (ELA, or expressive language age on
the REEL scale), and utterance production (MLU in words and in mor
phemes) .

The two age groups differed significantly (ELA, _t (14) = 2.79,

jj <.01; MLU in words, Mann-Whitney IJ = 9, £ <.007) or marginally (RLA,
t_ (14) = 1.61, .05< £ <.10) on these measures.
differences on any measure, all

Jt's

(14) <1,

There were no sex
<.10.

Table 5 presents the main linguistic skill indices for the 16
children in the sample.

For the purpose of comparison with other

samples, mean length of utterance (MLU) is presented in morphemes.

MLU

in morphemes averaged only .01 higher than MLU in words, indicating
that the use of by-word calculation for subsequent analyses results in
no systematic underestimation of these children's productions.

The

younger group of children ranged from Early to Late State I speech on
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Table 5
Linguistic Skill Indices for Subjects

Characteristics

Sub.i ect

Language Measures

Chronological
Age2

MLU3

ELA4

RLA5

F
F
F
F
M
M
M
M

18
19
20
21
17
19
19
19

1.11
1.92
1.05
1.67
1.14
1.22
1.48
1.19

24
27
20
30
22
22
24
20

24
30
24
30
24
24
24
20

F
F
F
F
M
M
M
M

24
27
27
28
24
24
24
26

1.39
3.04
1.76
3.09
1.57
1.94
1.56
2.55

24
30
30
32
27
30
24
31

27
30
31
34
30
32
24
33

Sex^

YOUNGER
1 ......
2 ......
3 ......
4 ......
5 ......
6 ......
7 ......
8 ......
OLDER
9 ......
10......
11 ......
1 2 ......
13......
14......
15......
16......

1 F = female,

M = male

3 in months
3 in words
4 Expressive Language A g e , in months
3 Receptive Language Age, in months
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the basis of MLU (in morphemes); children in the two-year-old group
ranged from Early Stage I to Early Stage IV.

Using a formula derived

from a large sample (Miller, 1981), it can be noted that all boys in
the sample fall within one standard deviation of the mean MLU (in
morphemes) predicted for children from a middle class American popula
tion.

Three girls (# 2, 10, and 12) had higher than predicted MLUs and

can be considered slightly advanced; three girls (# 3, 9, and 11) had
MLUs lower than predicted, and can be considered somewhat delayed in
utterance production, although their general expressive skills (ELA)
were age-appropriate.
The main measures of language ability utilized for comparison with
experimental performance were the two REEL scales.

Mean length of

utterances is not logically associated with the ability to produce
clearly formulated responses to target questions, although it might be
expected to correlate with factors such as lexicon size and sentence
comprehension which would be more directly associated with experimental
performance.

Hence, the REEL scales, with their solicited reports of

lexicon size and comprehension, were used as the main language indices.
It should be noted that, while there are age group differences on
all measures used, the two groups were not ideally separated in terms
of language ability.

In particular, two one-year-old girls (# 2 & 4)

exceeded two two-year-old children (# 9 & 15) on all three measures.
This cross-over allows exchange of these two pairs to form linguistic
groups rather than age groups.

The distinction between linguistic and

age groups will be raised below.
In the debriefing interview, five parents of older group children
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reported that their children understood all target forms well enough
to supply an appropriate response.

Only one child in the younger group,

however, had a parent who expected that he could understand all target
forms.

Only two parents, both with children in the younger group,

maintained that their children could not understand any of the targets
as they were worded.

The remaining seven parents argued that their

children understood only some of the target questions.

In general,

then, parental reports indicate that the children fall across a range
of linguistic skill, with no strong floor or ceiling effects for either
age group and sufficient within-sample variability to allow post hoc
comparisons and contrasts.

The two age groups can be considered as

moderately distinct in terms of communicative skill.

However, the

relationship between functional aspects of response and independent
assessments of language skill have never been precisely delineated.
Let us assume that, in a general sense, the difference between the two
age groups represents a detectable difference
cess the literal meaning of target forms.

in the ability to pro

Such a difference would

result in age-qualifications of hypotheses.

Relevance of language level

Since the ability to derive a primary function is a characteristic
of a structural model, this model would predict an age-related increase
in informing responses to target questions.

In addition, nonmeaningful

responses (ignoring, ambiguous responses) should fade with the advent
of an understanding of grammatical aspects of communicative intent.
Still, it is not entirely clear that a parent's report that a child
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"understands the question as worded" signifies a level of understanding
sufficient to derive a fully informed primary meaning.

Until the rela

tionship between grammar and direct speech acts has been more thoroughly
elucidated, it is a conservative course to invoke the strategic model
notion that the level of grammatical understanding displayed by twoyear-olds may not be sufficient to warrant a structural model.
case, the question has an empirical side.

In any

If two-year-olds give a very

high proportion of informing responses, then it may be that they are
using wording and that a structural model is a valid one for this age
range.

If they do not, then the model is not apporpriate for children

of this age.

The ultimate truth of a structural model is not in ques

tion here, only its validity for very young children.
The strategic and cue models are less concerned with linguistic
skill, although they both qualify their hypotheses in the face of
information about grammatical knowledge.

A strategic model predicts

minor increases in informing responses for more skilled (i.e., older)
children, and increases in the effect of preceding discourse.

A cue

utilization model predicts increases in conflated responses— responses
indicative of perceived ambiguity— with the growth of literal under
standing.
These specific predictions, and the affirmation of such predictions,
are not critical in the current investigation.

The real import is

framing the question which the following data address.

For one- and

two-year-old children with 'normal' communication development, which of
the three models best describes responses to conversationally embedded
questions?
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Summary of Hypotheses

Given the general characteristics of the three response models,
and information on the experience and language level of the subject
group, specifichypotheses about children's behavior in the experimental
setting can be constructed.
can be directly addressed:

There are four aspects of experiment which
wording context, and age/linguistic skill.

Wording

Over the course of Experiment I, each child was presented with
four alternative wordings of the same content.
tives,

(2) "Can you...?",

this?".

These were:

(1) impera

(3) target What-questions, and (4) "What's

The three models make differential predictions about children's

responses.
The predictions of the structural model reflect the formal
classification of the contexted utterances:
direct directives,

(1) imperative cases are

(2) "Can you...?" is a conventional directive,

(3)

targets are direct tests, and (4) "What's this?" is a direct testing
question (see pp. 3-7).

If it can be assumed that the children in this

sample are in the process of mastering the match between wording and
primary pragmatic meaning, then the following hypotheses can be con
structed:

(1) imperatives should receive only simple action responses,

(2) "Can you...?" should receive both action and informing types of
response, (3) target questions and "What's this?" should be answered
only with informing responses, and the percentage should be close to
identical.
The strategic model predicts little or no effect of wording for
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children of this age range.

According to this model, the dominant

response to all stimuli should be the simple action response (see p. 9,
cf. p. 10).
The cue utilization model, because it maintains that routine forms
will be lexicalized and the nonroutine forms will be perceived as
ambiguous, makes the following predictions:

(1) imperatives and "Can

you...?" will receive an identically high percentage of simple action
responses as routine directives,

(2) "What's this?" will receive almost

exclusively informing responses as a routine testing question, and (3)
responses to target questions will not conform to any other pattern of
response, since these are not routine questions.
There may be responses to targets which contain both action and
informing components.

Such responses function as a special test case

for the three models.

In a structural system, such responses indicate

that the classification of targets as direct tests has somehow gone
awry, and that the questions have been mistakenly computed as implied
forms (pp. 4-5).

Still, the conflated response should preserve its

natural history of an initial testing function, followed by a derived
action interpretation.

That is, the informing component should precede

the action component.
The strategic model predicts the reverse.

The informing component

should follow the action response, as if it were an overlaid function
or a mere confirmation of the action.
A cue utilization model, because it considers nonroutine forms as
ambiguous, is tolerant of all kinds of directionality in conflated
responses.

If anything, true conflation, or simultaneous production of
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action and informing components is favored as an index that the
questions are indeed perceived as ambiguous.

Contextual Effects

The only contextual effects of concern to a structural model are
those which determine whether a primary meaning is felicitous or not
(pp. 6-7).

Since all presentations of target questions were constructed

so as to be felicitous with a testing interpretation, structural theory
predicts no effect of the contextual variables (preceding discourse,
gesture, toy type) manipulated here.

That is, the structural model

predicts that there will be no effect of these contextual aspects.
The strategic model, in contrast, anticipates some effects.

If,

and only if, the preceding discourse is successful in inducing an
informing response to the discourse which is constructed to operate in
this manner (i.e., informing discourse), then the preceding discourse
should affect response (p. 9).

Specifically, informing responses

should follow informing discourse; action responses should follow
directive and neutral discourse.

This pattern is expected to strengthen

over age.

There are no predictions regarding the effects of gesture on

response.

There is a possibility of an effect of toy context.

The

absence of toys may function as a stop-action marker, thus decreasing
action responses to the Pictures II condition.

Hence, the presence of

a toy effect on action responses would not be contradictory to a
strategic approach.
The cue utilization model favors the modulation of response
through contextual cuing.

No specific prediction about preceding
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discourse and target response can be made, however, because of the lack
of empirical investigation into discourse cuing.

There are, on the

other hand, several effects anticipated for gestural cuing.

Gesture

is expected to be taken as a cue for nonverbal response (pp. 11-12).
Hence, it should raise the probability of all responses which commonly
contain nonverbal components— reference, conflation of action and
informing, simple acting and simple orienting.

As an attentional

device also, it should reduce ignoring of target questions by ensuring
an orientation response at minimum.
response (p.12).

Toy type should also affect

Pictures II should be associated with an inflated

rate of reference and simple informing responses.

Note that this is

somewhat different from the decrease in action responses suggested by
the strategic model.

Age/linguistic skill effects

The three models can also be used to generate predictions of how
responses to target forms should change across age or skill.

Because

the target questions are direct testing questions by a structural
analysis, this model would predict that the dominant response should be
the simple informing response.

This response should strengthen with

increasing age and grammatical knowledge, replacing responses which
are not standard.

Changes which are more closely related to linguistic

level are in line with the structural model's emphasis on primary
functional meaning (pp. 3-6).
If a strategic model is to be validated, children should give
simple action responses to target questions.

This pattern should be
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somewhat stronger in the one-year-old group because it is less likely
that they would have learned appropriate stop-action markers.

One

pattern would be expected to change with linguistic skill— any effect
of informing discourse on attenuating action responses should increase
with linguistic level since the ability to utilize discourse is assummed
to be a linguistically-based skill (Shatz, 1978b).
The cue utilization model considers the target forms as ambiguous
in function, and predicts a scatter across standard response types.
As with the structural model, there is an anticipated decrease in
ignoring and ambiguous responses between one and two years as children
approach an adult discourse model.

Simple orienting responses are also

expected to decrease with age, as they are supplemented by informing
and action components (p.13).

In addition, it is expected that the

pragmatic system becomes differentiated with age, with responses
becoming more closely tuned to contextual cues.

Linguistically-based

cues (preceding discourse) would be associated with increases in lin
guistic skill, whereas nonlinguistic cues (gesture, toy type) would be
associated with age-based experiential changes.
As previously mentioned, there may indeed be no effects of age or
linguistic status, as there are no a priori grounds for determining the
minimum separation for establishing such effects.

The absence of any

of the above effects, therefore, cannot disconfirm any of the models.
On the other hand, the observation of effects can lend preferential
support to one of the theories.
Thus, the three response models make differential predictions on
four counts:

the effect or wording on response, the effect of context
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on responses to targets, and age/linguistic effects on response.
Evidence pertaining to the three models will be presented according to
each of these areas in turn.
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IV. RESULTS

Responses can be viewed as varying with the wording of a speech
act, its contextual embedding, or with the age and skill of its
producer.

The actual effects of each of these factors are presented

below in light of the three response models being entertained.

The Effect of Wording on Response

Each child was presented with three types of nontarget utterance
in addition to the
of stimuli.

complex What-questions which formed the main corpus

These nontarget forms were scheduled not as statistical

controls, but for descriptive purposes.
Table 6 shows the distribution of functional response types across
wordings.

This table indicates that, functional response type is not

independent of wording.
response.

That is, wording does appear to affect

However, the pattern of response is as critical as the

existence of an effect.
The pattern does not strongly support the structural model. "Can
you...?" wordings receive no greater number of conflated responses than
do the direct imperatives, _t (14) = 1.14

>.10.

Nor are the frequencies

of any informing type raised in response to these indirect but conven
tional forms.

While the prediction that targets and "What's this?"

questions should receive more informing types is borne out, it would
appear that target forms receive far more action class responses than
most structural models would find tolerable.
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Table 6

Distribution of Functional Response Types across Target and
Nontarget Stimuli, Experiment I

Stimulus Type
Imperative

"Can you?"

Informing*........

2%

10%

61%

31%

Conflated.........

6%

13%

8%

23%

Simple action.....

63%

52%

2%

15%

Nonstandard.......

29%

25%

29%

30%

Number of Stimuli..

48

48

48

768

Response Type

"What's this?"

*includes simple informing and reference responses

Target
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The finding that there is a contingency between wording and
response does not support a strategic model for children of this age.
This indicates that early investigations were limited to too narrow a
*

range of wordings.
The overall pattern supports a cue utilization model.

The

responses to imperative forms are largely confined to the simple action
class.

This is also true of the "Can you...?" form; the lack of

difference between imperatives and "Can you...?" indicates that direct
and indirect directives are perceived as equally direct.

"What's

this?" exhibits a pattern which is different from that of the more
ambiguous target forms, again in line with the cuing model.

Nonstandard

responses are more or less constant across stimulus types, indicating
that all forms were equally comprehensible or meaningful to children.
The profile of responses to target questions deserves special
consideration.

In an adult structural model, these are direct test

questions, and were even used as such by the parents of these children.
Given that the context is felicitous for a testing interpretations, why
did these children answer with informing on fewer than one-third of the
occasions?
It is not simply a matter that some children are appropriately
offering informing responses whereas other children simply lack the
pragmatic acumen to respond in the structurally appropriate manner.
Table 7 shows that, while individual patterns do exist, no child
confined his or her responses to a single pattern.
effects will be discussed later.)

(Age and skill

These questions are not assigned a

unitary pragmatic function, either informing or action, by any child.
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Table 7

Individual Response Profiles *for Target Questions, Experiment I

Response Type

Subject

Simple Action

Nonstandard

Total

Informing**

Conflated

15
14
6
12
15
10
16
17

19
13
0
7
7
7
2
12

1
14
13
9
5
9
6
8

13
7
29
20
21
22
20
11

48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48

9
27
31
19
1
6
25
19

20
4
10
24
4
8
19
23

7
8
3
1
20
8
1
4

12
9
4
4
23
26
3
2

48
48
48
48
48
48
48
48

YOUNGER
1 ......
2 ......
3 ......
4 ......
5 ......
6 ......
7 ......
8 ......

OLDER
9 ......
10......
11 ......
12......
13......
1 4 ......
15 ......
1 6 ......

*all data presented as number of responses
**includes simple informing and reference responses
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Rather, they are treated as ambiguous, with children varying their
responses from occasion to occasion.

The overall response profile,

then, is not consonant with either a structural or a strategic model.

Conflated responses

The rate of conflated response is high enough that adding these
responses to the category of informing would raise the rate of informing
to over 50 percent, consequently supporting at least a version of a
structural model.

This can be legitimately accomplished, however,

only if there is evidence that conflated responses are primarily
informing responses.
Previous investigations (e.g., Shatz, 1978b) of responses to
ambiguous questions have generally not distinguished conflated responses
from unitary function responses, so little information is available on
this point.

Clark (1979) has suggested that, for certain types of con-

texted utterances, the responder must reply with a literal or direct
meaning move before he or she responds to the derived or indirect
meaning, in cases of dual function responses.

Although Clark's

utterance types and contexts were distinctly different from those used
here, the data partially substantiate his view.

While the informative

portion (the direct meaning by a structural model) of the response was
instigated prior to the action component (29%) more frequently than the
reverse (13%), this difference is not significant.

Significantly more

common than either of these was simultaneous, or true, conflation, 58%,
F (2,28) = 24.56, £ <.001.
The rate of primary informative components in conflation does not
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appear to be high enough to warrant classifying conflated responses
along with clear cases of informing.

In other words, it is difficult

to credit the structural model with additional evidence.

Answering the question

Aside from the lack of a clearly dominant response, I have not
addressed the strategic model's notion of response heuristics.

A

response heuristic should not result in a reply that is well-tailored
to the question, except fortuitously.

The existence of such strategies

can thus be tested by dividing the target question set into two classes
— those questions which require specification of an act (e.g., "What
do you do with an apple?") and those which require specification of an
object (e.g., "What do you eat?").

Since the strategic model has

concerned itself with action responses, it is appropriate to look at
all responses in which an action occurs (i.e., conflated and action
responses), examining them in order to determine whether or not they
are related to the type of question asked.

A second possible response

strategy, one offered by the cue utilization model, is available for
comparison; all cases of orientation in response (simple orientation,
most reference responses) can be examined.

A third class of nonverbal

responses, indications (simple informings expressed nonverbally), is
also available for the investigation of strategy.
Children who are using a nonlinguistic action or orienting
strategy should not respond differentially according to question type.
Turning to a functional analysis summarized in Table 8, children do in
fact respond significantly more often with action to act-required
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Table 8

Percentage of each Question-Requirement Type receiving
Nonverbal Responses, Experiment I

Question-Requirement
Type of
Nonverbal Response

Act-Required

Ob.i ect-Required

Action................

45.8%

34.4%

Indication............

3.7%

7.3%

Orientation...........

21.1%

24.7%
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questions than they do to object-required questions wherein an action
response is appropriate but superfluous, I? (1,14) = 7.27,

jj

<.025.

There was also a tendency for children to produce more indication
responses (pointing and showing) to object-required questions, F (1,14)
= 3.41, p. < *10*

Orientation (both simple and accompanying informing),

on the other hand, appears stable across question type, F (1,14) = 1.25,

2 >.10.

Orientation may be a simple strategy unrelated to the pro

cessing of linguistic information, but action and nonverbal informing
may be formulated on the basis of sentential processing.

Evidence

thus seems to indicate that orienting responses are strategies and
should not be considered as direct answers to questions.

To borrow

Goffman's (1976) terminology, they may be responses, but they are not
replies.

Actions, however, do seem to be valid replies, and not

strategies at all.
There is no dominant response to target questions.

Conflated

responses to target questions tend to be simultaneously, rather than
successively, conflated.

And the only nonverbal response not clearly

related to the question (i.e., probably strategic) is orientation, and
not action.

These findings favour a cue utilization model.

Contextual Effects on Responses to Targets

Each target question was presented under six different contextual
conditions in the course of Experiment I, and under two additional
contexts in Experiment II.

The contexts manipulated were:

preceding

discourse (three levels), gesture (two levels), and type of toy (three
levels).

These contexts were designed to test hypotheses generated by
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the structural (no effect on meaningful responses), strategic (informing
discourse and pictures inhibit action) and cuing (gestural and toy type
effects) models of response.

The effects of the two contextual

variables manipulated in Experiment I are presented separately from the
contextual manipulations which spanned Experiments I and II.

Age by

context interactions will be presented in a later section.

Experiment I:

Gesture and discourse

The results of Experiment I are presented in Table 9.

The effects

of context will be discussed first in relation to nonstandard responses.
Less than 10 percent of target questions received responses which
were ambiguous and not codable.

There were no context effects.

Slightly over 10 percent of all target questions were ignored.
That is, the child appeared not to have heard the question.

A

discourse by gesture interaction, 1? (2,28) = 15.76, £ <.01, and a main
effect for gesture, F (1,14) = 11.40, £ <.01, were obtained.

Sheffe

comparisons reveal that gestures significantly reduce ignoring except
when they follow informative discourse.

Informative discourse is

devoted to engaging the child in looking and talking prior to the
asking of a question, thus mitigating the attention-securing function
of gestures.
Simple orienting responses are significantly increased in
frequency by the presence of a gesture, 1? (1,14) = 5.40, £ <.05.
Simple orientation is sensitive to the presence of a gesture.
No gestural effect was obtained, however, for the simple acting
response, F_ (1,14) = 2.84, £ >.10.

The gestural effect, therefore,

Table 9

Distribution of Functional Response Types by Experimental Condition, Experiment I

Condition

Directive

Informational

Neutral

Gestured

NoGest

Gestured

NoGest

Gestured

NoGest

Total

17
18
28
24

26
17
22
19

19
20
31
22

27
9
28
16

12
25
39
19

39
13
20
17

140
102
178
117

Simple orienting.....
Ignoring..............
Ambiguous............

15
6
10

9
24
11

13
13
10

6
21
21

17
6
10

8
23
8

68
93
70

Total...................

128

128

128

128

128

128

768

Functional Response

MEANINGFUL
Simple informing.....
Reference............
Conflated............
Simple acting........

NONSTANDARD
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would not seem to apply to all responses which tend toward nonverbal
expression.
The presence of a gesture dramatically reduced the frequency of
simple informing responses, I? (1,14) = 13.12, £ <.005.

That is,

pointing gestures lower the probability of a response reflecting a
straightforward testing interpretation of the question.
Reference responses also reflect a testing interpretation, but
one which is embedded in a here-and-now situational context.

The

presence of a gesture seems to encourage such responses, I? (1,14) =
9.23, _g. <.01.

Children respond to gestured questions by orienting to

an object and producing
occasion.

an informing response concurrently, on

Recall that simple orientations also are more frequent under

gestured conditions.

Gestures serve to elicit orientation; these

orientations are, on occasion, accompanied by informing responses to
the question.
There is a corresponding gestural effect for conflated responses.
These are also increased by the presence of a gesture, J? (1,14) = 15.36,
£ <.005.
Response types can be collapsed to allow a more thorough investi
gation of the role of context in children’s
orienting responses and

responses.

Simple

reference responses can be combined to yield an

index for overall orientation; conflated responses can be combined with
simple acting responses

to yield an overall action index; the addition

of reference and simple

informing responses offers an index of

informing rate.
In line with the above effects, the overall rate of orientation is
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increased only by the presence of a gesture, I? (1,14) = 21.10, £ <.001.
Overall action responses are also more frequent under gestured condi
tions, F_ (1,14) = 23.98, £ <.001.
However, there is no gestural effect on overall informing
responses, I? (1,14) = 1.44, £ >.10.

A gesture may inhibit the produc

tion of purely informative responses, but it does not seem to be taken
as a cue that an informational response is not appropriate.

Responses to setting sequences.

In order to assess the effect of

the preceding discourse on children, children's responses to setting
sequences were examined.

Responses to the imperative or declarative

sentences immediately preceding targets were coded as action, as
attentive looking or talking, or as uncodable due to uncertain atten
tiveness, gaze direction, or conflation of response.

As indicated in

Table 10, approximately three-quarters of the setting sequences were
responded to in a functionally appropriate manner.

Cases in which a

child responded with action to declarative setting sentences were rare;
cases of simple attentiveness or talking in response to imperative
setting sentences did not occur.

Approximately 17% of all setting

sequences offered were clearly ignored, a rate similar to that observed
in response to the target questions (13%).

Children do not appear to

be ignoring the setting sequences as a rule, and they are generally
responding to the sequences in a functionally appropriate manner.

The

lack of preceding discourse effects on subsequent responses to target
questions cannot be attributed to the child's functional set preceding
the targets.

Children are, by and large, responding to the preceding
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Table 10
Type and Number of Responses to Setting Sequences, Experiment I

Directive Set

Subiect

Informational Set

Acts

Look/Talks

Ignores

Acts

Looks/Talks

Ignores

11
12
10
2
6
11
12
14

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
4
5
2
0
3
3
1

0
0
0
0
2
0
1
3

9
13
11
7
4
9
12
9

4
3
4
1
0
1
2
7

YOUNGER
1 ....
2 ....
3 ....
4 ....
5 ....
6 ....
7 ....
8 ....

---

% codable
responses

77%

0%

23%

10
13
14
14
13
13
14
14

--

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
—

--

87%

0%

13%

1

—

—

3%

75%

22%

0
0
0
0
2
0
0
3

7
3
2
2
3
6
4
1

-

6
7
9
11
6
8
12
11
— *

5%

68%

27%

OLDER
9 ....
10....
11....
12....
13....
14 ....
15....
16....
% codable
responses

Note:

5
2
0
1
1
3
2
1

Each child was given 16 directive settings and 16 informational
settings, but response to the setting was not coded in cases
where attentiveness, direction of gaze, or function of response
was not clear.
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discourse, but this does not seem to affect their responses to target
What-questions.

Summary of Experiment I data.

The above analyses converge on

two basic principles.
(1)

A gesture induces an orienting response.

(2)

Although children attended to the discourse which preceded What-

questions, this discourse did not affect the function of their
responses to the questions themselves.

Experiment I vs. Experiment II;

Toy type

Following completion of Experiment I, each child participated in a
second experiment.

The target question frames used in this experiment

were identical to those used in Experiment I, although an individual
child did not hear the same wordings in the two experiments.

Each

child was, as in Experiment I, asked to respond to two wordings of each
question frame.

Each wording was presented twice, once in conjunction

with a relevant picture and once in conjunction with an irrelevant toy.
For comparison with Experiment I data, data from Experiments I and II
were converted to percentages.

For the most common comparison, that of

Experiment I to Toys II to Pictures II, the ratio of questions asked
was 6:1:1.
Some analyses were confounded by the experimenter's deviation from
the Experiment II script.

Although all questions were to be asked as

if they were Neutral-NoGesture, an examination of the video records
revealed systematic drifts towards informative discourse and gesturing.
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Table 11 presents the deviations from the scripted Neutral-NoGesture
context of Experiment II, expressed in terms of the number and percen
tage of questions which were not embedded in a Neutral-NoGesture
context.
A drift is apparent for questions associated with pictures.

It

has been noted by Murphy (1978) and Ninio and Bruner (1978) that
mothers use informative discourse and pointing when looking through
books with their children.
experimenter is doing.

This seems to capture much of what the

If the present data are any indication, the

tendency to talk informatively and point while looking through books
with little children is fairly strong and overrides procedural instruc
tion not to do so.
all deviations.

Shifts to informative discourse account for 32% of

Although these shifts were more frequent for pictures

than for toys, this effect was not significant, > ( 1 )

= .01, £ > .10.

Since no experimental effect was found for discourse type in
Experiment I, the slight shift to informative talk here is probably of
no consequence.

Questions inadvertantly preceded by informative dis

course in Experiment II received a 61% rate of informing overall, com
pared with 67% of questions not so preceded.

The lack of a discourse

effect revealed in Experiment I also seems to show up in Experiment II,
at least for informative discourse.

The relatively high rate of

gesturing, in contrast, may very well affect interpretation of Experi
ment II data.

In Experiment I, gestures raised the frequency of

orienting responses, while lowering the frequency of simple informing
responses.

However, Experiment II was structured to preclude a great

number of orientation responses (by ensuring that orientation was

Table 11
Number of Target Questions by Contextual Embeddings, Experiment II

Type of Contextual Embedding

Directive

Condition

Gesture

Informative

NoGest

Neutral

Gesture

NoGest

Gesture

NoGest

Number of
Questions

Percent
Deviation

Pictures II....

1

1

30

24

24

48

128

63%

Toys II.......

1

1

2

27

14

83

128

35%

Percent
Deviation.....

1%

1%

13%

20%

15%

NA

256

49%

Note:

Neutral-NoGesture was the scripted condition of presentation.
away from this type of contextual embedding.

Hence, deviations are deviations
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established prior to the question).
Codability.

Is Experiment II, as a distinctly non-normal context

and interaction, confusing to the children in the sample?
not.

Apparently

The percentage of codable responses (meaningful responses and

simple orientations) is presented in Table 12.
experiment type, _F (2,28) = 2.54 £ > .10.

There are no effects of

Recall, however, that fewer

of the Experiment II than Experiment I questions were gestured, when
compared with all other data cells.

Gestures in Experiment I were

associated with a higher frequency of codable responses, due to the
association between gestures and the orienting response.
II, therefore, the rate of codable response
tural accompaniments of target questions.

In Experiment

was examined across ges
Codable responses occured at

approximately 71% regardless of the presence of a gesture, X
.002, £ >.10.

(1) =

Since the structure of the experiment biases against

the orientation to gesture by ensuring orientation prior to stimulus
presentation, the gesturing directed to children does not seem to be of
consequence in experimental comparisons.

Function of response.

In place of exclusive function indices,

general function indices were used to avoid problems of low frequencies.
Table 13 shows that type of experiment did not affect the percentage of
questions which received informing response components, _F (2,28) =
1.29, £ >.10.
There is a more striking effect of experimental type on the per
centage of action responses, F (2,28) = 53.67, £ <.001.

Here Scheffe

comparisons reveal that each experiment type elicits a distinctly

72

Table 12
Percentage of Questions receiving Codable Responses* in
Experiments I and II

Experiment Type

Age Group

Experiment I

Toys II

Pictures II

Total

Younger......

72%

74%

63%

71%

Older..... .

82%

75%

72%

79%

Total........

77%

74%

67%

75%

*Meaningful responses and simple orientations combined
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Table 13

Percentage of Questions receiving Response
Components in Experiments I and II

Experiment Type

Component

Experiment I

Toys II

Pictures II

Total

Informing....

55%

56%

64%

56%

Action.......

39%

26%

2%

32%
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different rate of action responses.

Hence there is some indication that

children are tailoring action responses to linguistically encoded input.
The rate of action responses to the inappropriate Toys II questions is
not very high, being midway between that for appropriate toy-contexted
questions and that of appropriate picture-contexted questions.

It would

thus appear that children are capable of perceiving mismatches between
linguistic content and object context in the selection of a response,
although they do not always make that connection.

That What-questions

do not automatically stimulate action responses is reflected in the
almost total absence of action responses in the Pictures II condition.

Summary of Experiment II data.

The following represent the main

points of Experiment II performance.
(1) The protocol for asking questions in a 'neutral' setting was not
followed by the experimenter.

Almost one-half of the questions asked

while the child was looking at a picture was preceded by informational
discourse.

Furthermore, many questions directed at children were

accompanied by gestures.

It appears difficult not to talk about

pictures when looking through them with children.

Additionally, it

seems difficult to inhibit gestures while talking with very young
children.
(2) On a very global level, the experimental procedure did not seem to
be confusing to the children.

Experiment II questions received the

same percentage of codable responses as Experiment I questions.
lack of effect did not appear to be attributable to the protocol
deviations mentioned above.

This
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(3) The rate of informing-class responses did not vary across experi
ment, with slightly over one-half of all questions receiving informing
components.
(4) Action interpretations, in contrast, were sensitive to such contex
tual variations.

These interpretations are essentially absent when a

child is looking at a picture; they occur in response to about onequarter of target questions asked while the child is attending to an
irrelevant toy; and they occur to approximately one-third of target
questions asked during a normal play session.

Summary of Contextual Effects

The absence of a preceding discourse effect on response supports a
structuralist model of question response and disconfirms a strategic
model, in light of children's appropriate responses to setting sequen
ces.

As previously mentioned, the cue utilization model has taken no

stance on the effect of preceding discourse.

Hence, there is no

evidence for or against this model on this point.
The presence of a gestural effect can be viewed as evidence
against the structuralist model.

The strategic model makes no firm

commitments about the effects of gesture.

Therefore, the gestural

effect provides weak evidence against this stance.

The effect does

support a cuing model in that the presence of a gesture affects the
production of orientation-accompanied responses and conflated responses.
The effect of toy activity on action response components favors
both a strategic and cue utilization model.

The constancy of informing

components, however, is in line with a structural model.
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While all models can be supported to some extent by various dimen
sions of the results, only the cue model is not faced with some contrary
facts.

As with wording, then, the data seem to favor a cue utilization

model.

However, a final decision must await an analysis of how

responses change across age and linguistic skill.

Age/Linguistic Skill Effects

The responses to target questions, broken down by age, are dis
played according to the fully differentiated response code in Table 14.
The response pattern can still be seen as a scatter, exhibiting no
strong tendency to favor a structrualist or strategic model.
are age trends of interest in these data.
be discussed by three main topics:

But there

Age and skill effects will

(1) simple age effects,

(2) age vs.

language grouping, and (3) age interaction effects.

Simple age effects

Many responses which reflected an ambiguity or lack of clarity on
either the coder's or the child's part were scattered thinly but evenly
over the subtypes of this category.

As Table 14 indicates, younger

children gave significantly more of these unclear

or ambiguous respon

ses than did older children, 1? (1,14) = 6.66, j) < .025.

This suggests

that with increasing age, children's responses show greater convergence
with the adult pragmatic system in that they are better able to produce
responses that are clear and easily interpreted by an adult observer,
and which fall into functionally appropriate categories.
There are no other significant simple age effects.
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Table 14

Distribution of Functional Response Types by Age,
Experiment I

One--Year-Olds
Functional Response

n

Simple informing....

64

(17%)

Reference............

41

Conflated............

Two- Year-Olds
(%)

n

(%)

76

(20%)

140

(18%)

(11%)

61

(16%)

102

(13%)

67

(17%)

111

(29%)

178

(23%)

Simple action.......

65

(17%)

52

(14%)

117

(15%)

Simple orienting....

49

(13%)

19

(5%)

68

(9%)

Ignoring.............

48

(13%)

45

(12%)

93

(12%)

Ambiguous............

50

(13%)

20

(5%)

70

(9%)

384

(101%)

(101%)

768

(99%)

Total

(%)

n

Total

384
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Age vs. language grouping

Earlier, it was suggested that, instead of age-group classifica
tion, children could be classified into two nonoverlapping linguistic
skill groups.

Certain linguistic skill effects, even in the absence of

age effects, could be construed as support for a structural theory
predicted on a primary, grammatically-based function.

That is,

although age group analyses reveal few main effects of age, it may
still be worthwhile to group children by linguistic criteria.

But on

12 selected dependent variables, in no case did regrouping children
into two linguistic groups (MLU = 1.6 +) result in a greater betweengroup difference.

On nine of these variables, the between-age

differences were larger than the between-linguistic group differences.
On a two-tailed sign test, this group criterion effect is significant,
£ < .004.

For the range of children selected, age differences result

in stronger effects than do differences in linguistic skill.
Although this pattern is suggestive, the difference is between
marginal to nonsignificant effects and even smaller effects.

It is

likely that a

somewhat wider separation between age groups would have

resulted in a

greater number of significant age effects, but such a

separation would also dispense with the age-linguistic group cross
over obtained.

Despite significant differences in the linguistic

skills of the

two age groups, the group effects suggested by these

data seem not

to be strongly associated with independent assessments

of linguistic

skill.
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Age interaction effects

Age was involved in four different but ultimately interrelated
interactions.
First, there is an interaction between age and gesture in the
offering of responses which contain action components, 1? (1,14) = 6.72,
2. < .025.

Scheffe comparisons reveal that only older children offer an

elevated number of action-class responses to gestured questions.

That

is, action components are produced most frequently by two-year-old
children under gestured conditions.
Since there is no interaction between age and gesture for simple
action responses, this result is largely attributable to an age by
gesture effect on conflated responses, F (1,14) = 6.67, 2 < *025.
Table 15 shows that, when older children observe gestured target utter
ances, they double their rate of conflated response.

These results

are not in line with the strategic model's prediction of a developmen
tal increase in sensitivity to stop-action markers.
The third age interaction effect is also associated with conflated
responses.

Two-year-olds produce a much higher rate of true or

simultaneous conflation than do one-year-olds, 1? (1,28) = 13.03, 2 <
.001.

As Table 16 suggests, older children may tend to interpret

target questions as truly ambiguous.
Only three children from the younger group responded with two
components simultaneously more frequently than with first one component,
then the other.

Every child in the older group did so.

This ability

to produce simultaneous conflation does not appear to be related to
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Table 15

*

Number of Action-Class Responses by Age and
Gestural Condition, Experiment I

Gestural Condition

Response

Gestured

No Gesture

Total

Younger
Simple acting...

35

30

65

Conflation.....

36

31

67

Total........

71

61

132

Simple acting...

30

22

52

Conflation.... .

72

39

111

102

61

163

Older

Total........

81

Table 16
Directionality of Response Components in the Conflation of
Action and Informing, Experiment I

Direction of Response Components

Group

Action— > Informing

Simultaneous

Informing— > Action

Total

Younger..

21%

41%

38%

100%

Older....

8%

67%

25%

100%

13%

58%

29%

Total
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linguistic sophistication, since the two linguistically advanced girls
in the younger group were clear one-reply-at-a-time responders.
This increase in true conflation may he due to an increase in the
ability to perform any two responses simultaneously, as an identical
effect obtains for reference responses.

Older children, when they

offer a reference response, look and inform at the same time, while
younger children do not do this any more frequently than the remaining
two directionality patterns, interaction T_ (1,28) = A.42, £ < .05,
Scheffe comparisons.

Summary

Not only is there no dominant functional response to target
questions, but there are only two simple age-or skill-related changes
in response.

The decrease in ambiguous responses with age can be

handled by either a structuralist or a cuing model.

The increase in

simultaneous conflation lends a slight advantage to the cuing model,
as it may indicate advances in the perception of ambiguity, or at
least in the ability to express such interpretations.

The lack of

linguistic group effects does not disconfirm a structuralist model,
but neither does it lend any direct support, especially in light of
linguistic group differences which are smaller than age group differ
ences.

An increasing ability to exploit contextual cues is consonant

with both the strategic model and the cue utilization model; since
this increase is towards, rather than away from, action responding,
the latter model would seem more appropriate.
Overall, the developmental phenomena presented by these data are
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most easily accommodated by the cue utilization model.

Change is

towards the abandonment of ambiguous responses, towards a facility in
producing unitary responses out of disparate components, and towards
exploiting gesture as an interpretive cue.
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V. DISCUSSION

Whenever there is talk, there are questions and responses.
Questions and responses, taken together, are frequently considered to
form a minimal dialogic unit— the adjacency pair (Churchill, 1978;
Goffman, 1976; Sacks, note 3).

A common investigative procedure is to

collect samples of such adjacency pairs and examine how the response
(even silence) serves as an answer or rejoinder to the question.

What

is often given perfunctory consideration, but rarely systematic
attention, is which properties of the question and its situation are
related to the response.
There are three models for how conversational participants
produce contextually-embedded responses to questions and which aspects
of an interaction are critical in question-response contingencies.
The first model emphasizes the role of literal understanding and
rather abstract aspects of the communicative situation, the second the
cognitive nature of the interactants, and the third the role of
learned, observable markers of intentionality.

Sources of Variation

In this investigation, three types of evidence were assembled in
order to assess the validity of the response models.

The first is the

effect that the wording or syntactic form of the stimulus has on
children's responses; the second, the effects of context on responses
to one of those syntactic forms; the third, the presence of develop
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mental effects on responses to the targeted syntactic form.

Wording

Equivalent contents were worded in four different ways: as
imperatives, "Can you" questions, "What's that", and as complex Whatquestions.

We already know that young children's responses vary with

question form (e.g., Dore, 1977; Ervin-Tripp, 1970), but those data
have come largely from natural sources, and not ones in which content
and context were controlled.

The items used here were presented under

conditions which support the following structural assignments: direct
directive (imperative), conventional directive ("Can you...?")> and
direct test ("What's that?" and complex What-questions).
Wording as a source of variation in response is a central concern
of the structual model.

As outlined earlier, theoretical work has

emphasized the importance of a functional assignment on the basis of
literal meaning as a component in the interpretation of speech acts
(see especially, Searle, 1975).

Performance models based on structural

theory, consequently, have focused on confirming that literal meaning
is processed (e.g., Carrell, 1981; Clark, 1979; Clark & Lucy, 1975;
Clark & Schunk, 1980).

Hence, if the validity of the structural model

is to be verified, it is essential that children's responses be shown
to vary with the syntactic form of an utterance.
The strategic model, in contrast, generates the proposal that
there should be few consistent effects of wording on response.

One-

and two-year-olds are presumed to lack the necessary syntactic and
pragmatic abilities (Shatz, 1978b).

While there may exist some
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emerging linguistic skills in children of this age, the strategic model
is not likely to be appropriate if there are strong effects of wording
on response.
In contrast to strategic theory and in alignment with the struc
tural model, the cue utilization model considers wording to be an
important source of variation in interactional response.

But since

this effect is mediated by factors different from those associated with
structural models (Cole, 1974; Sadock, 1972), the predicted wordingresponse pattern is discriminably different from that suggested by a
structural analysis.

Context

When context is entertained as a source of variation in inter
actions, it must be made clear what types or aspects of context are
under consideration.

All three models incorporate the notion of con-

textedness as essential to human communication.

But there are dis

agreements over what aspects of the total interaction can be expected
to have an impact on the participants.

The complex What-questions used

in the current experiments were presented while three aspects of
context were manipulated— the pragmatic function of the discourse
which immediately preceded the question (directive, informational,
neutral), the gestural accompaniment of the question (pointing at
referent, no gesture), and the toy activity in which the question was
embedded (semistructured play, orientation to a single irrelevant
action toy, orientation to a picture illustrating the question).
Because the target questions were consistently presented under
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conditions which support a direct testing interpretation (pp. 6-7), and
because the above mentioned contexts are not of the type which struc
tural theorists emphasize (p. 7), the structural model suggests that
children's responses should not vary with these contexts.

That is,

while the notion of context is a crucial one for structural theory, it
would not consider the types of context manipulated here to be an
important source of variation in interaction.
The strategic model, in contrast, suggests that some of these
contexts might affect response.

Contexts which could operate through

the direct inhibition of the action heuristic are considered as poten
tial sources of variation (p. 9).

Informational discourse might

operate in this manner, as could the absence of a toy upon which to act.
The absence of a relevant toy upon which to act should tend to inhibit
action, but this affect would be relatively weak for children of this
age.
The cue utilization model also considers context, especially of
the types manipulated here, as a source of response variation.

The

mechanism suggested is rather different from that mentioned above.
Instead of operating via response inhibition, context is presumed to
elicit direct functional responses (p. 13).

Developmental level

The final source of variation in these experiments is the develop
mental level of the participants.

While the questioner remained the

same for all, the children belonged to two different age groups (oneand two-year-olds) and fell across a range of linguistic development.
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The structural model is largely static and nondevelopmental.
However, processing models developed from structural speech act theory
can be used to generate developmental hypotheses.

Most importantly,

linguistic status should be a detectable source of response variation.
The predicted change is from nonstandard responses to informing res
ponses.

However, it is only fair to note at this point that the

structural theories are end-point models and characterizations of
adult competency, a n d .so cannot rise or fall according to the trajectory of very early development.
Strategic theory provides a counterpoint in that its predominant
concern is with age-related phenomena.

Specifically, it postulates a

developmental decrease in action responding.

This decrease is expected

to be especially apparent in action-inhibitory contexts (e.g., after
informative discourse).

One can assume that this decrease accompanies

age-related increases in informing-class responses.
Assuming convergence with the adult system, the cue utilization
model aligns with the structural model in anticipating developmental
decreases in nonstandard responses.

But because the cuing model has

little investment in either speech act classification or literal force
indicators, it does not argue that this and other changes are neces
sarily linked to changes in grammatical skill and understanding.

In a

developing organism, expanding symbol usage is not the only aspect of
growth which affects behavior.

Individual history and experience may

result in patterns which are not directly associated with what is
traditionally regarded as linguistic growth.

For this reason also, the

developmental patterns may not resemble an appropriate structural
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course.

Responses may reflect variations in a variety of developmental

indices (e.g., age, linguistic status).

They do so because children's

conceptions of the pragmatic system change as they negotiate their way
towards an integration of wording, context, and pragmatic function.
The importance of the three sources of variation differs for the
three models of pragmatic response.

While each model can be used to

generate some hypothesis about the role of these independent variables,
the variables are not necessarily of equal concern to the three models.
Wording is of prime concern to structural models, developmental effects
to the strategic model, and context to the cue utilization model.
While each factor in turn may not be of equal relevance to all models,
the manipulation of all three may nonetheless allow the selection of
one model over the others as the model which best characterizes the
interactional skills of very young children.

Patterns of Evidence

The structural model acquires limited support from the data
presented here.

When the same content was worded in different ways,

children used the wording of a message to formulate a response.

In

response to imperative wording, a direct encoding of directive intent,
children generally offered simple acting responses.

The same was true

for the most common conventional directive of maternal speech— the
"Can you" question.

In contrast, the direct test "What's this?"

received predominantly informing responses.
uniformly supportive.

But the data are not

The literal meaning of "Can you...?" questions

carries an informing force, but there is little tendency for these
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children to misinterpret these questions as information requests.

One

might expect such errors from learners, but they do not occur with
appreciable frequency.

On the other hand, the targeted What-questions,

despite structural conventionality and parental use for direct conven
tional informational functions, appeared to be recognized by children as
pragmatically ambiguous or nonconventional in wording and in context.
These children appear, then, to be making a large number of interpretive
errors for questions which, structurally, are much more straightforward
than "Can you...?" questions.

The overall pattern of response to

wording variations is not particularly encouraging for structural
theory.
An equivocal pattern also emerges when the effects of context on
response are considered.

Because the target questions were presented

under conditions which support a testing interpretation, these questions
can be classified as direct tests under a structural model.

Since

direct speech acts do not warrant further context-checking action (and
the model de-emphasizes the role of concrete conditions in any case),
the variables manipulated in the present experiments should have no
impact on responses.

In fact, there is no effect of preceding discourse,

and this finding supports a structural interpretation.

However, gesture

and toy type do affect response, and this argues against the model's
validity.
Somewhat more clearly, age and linguistic status effects do not
support a structural model.

The effect of one contextual variable—

gesture— increases rather than decreases with age.

Linguistic status,

at least within the range sampled here, is not related to response.
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Furthermore, linguistic status groupings result in less separation than
do age groupings, when magnitude of group divergence is the criterion.
The experimental data, then, do not align with a structural speech
act model of communicative interaction, at least as specified in the
performance terms used here.

While children do attend to the wording

of speech addressed to them and while they do generally offer structur
ally meaningful replies, there is little evidence that their responses
reflect a system of structured relationship among wording, abstract
contextual conditions, and logic.
The picture is little better for the strategic model of adultchild interaction.

While children do offer structurally-unwarranted

action responses to What-questions, such responses do not occur with
very high frequency.

This cannot be attributed to the acquisition of

"What...?" as a stop-action marker, since no child showed anything
approaching complete inhibition of action-class responses to target
questions.

Similarly, an examination of directionality in conflated

responses indicates that action responses tend to follow or coincide
with informing responses, rather than precede them.
Proponents of the strategic model argue that context serves only
to inhibit action, and not to prompt it.

It is true that orientation

to pictures can reduce the frequency of action responses.
ren, however, did not inhibit

These child

direct action responses when deliberately

involved in informing-type interactions which are embedded in a play
setting.

The third contextual variable, gesture, actually served to

increase the rate of conflated responses.
explained by a simple strategic model.

This finding cannot be
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With respect to age and status changes, there is no evidence of a
developmental weakening of action responses.
ing exploitation of stop-action markers.

Nor is there any increas

While it is true that sensi

tivity to one cue increases with age, this change is toward exploitation
of a pro-conflation cue, and not a stop-action marker.
Although these children are very young, a strategic model of inter
action does not seem appropriate.

They evidence a sense that the target

questions require informing responses or that, at least, they are
ambiguous.

If there ever was an impulse to act in a

physical sense, it

has been left far behind.
Obviously, neither model is clearly supported by the data.

The

most common response to targets overall was the conflated response,
followed by the simple informing response, the simple acting response,
and reference, in that order and excluding nonstandard types.

The

differences in frequency, however, are not strong and are not consistent
for both age groups.

There is little or no evidence

purely strategic or purely structural model in these

to favor either a
data.

Rather than a simple structural speech act model or a simple stra
tegy model, the following pattern seems to apply to these data.

By

the time children begin to talk, the action response is largely con
strained to those forms which are routine directives.

By this time,

the reference response is clearly associated with the most common
routine test question.

In cases where the linguistically encoded

message does not warrant a routine interpretation, one-year-olds
scatter their responses haphazardly across potentially appropriate prag
matic types and a few inappropriate ones.

In the same situation, two-
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year-olds are more systematic in that they attempt to use contextual
cues in selecting either a direct (informing) or nonconventional
(action) response.
In place of a simple structural or a simple strategic model, these
data suggest that responses offered by language-learning children .best
fit an intermediary pattern.

There is indeed development towards an

adult-like pragmatic system, in that structurally appropriate responses
would seem to account for a greater proportion of answers offered by
two-year-olds than by one-year-olds.

There is also evidence for a

response 'strategy1, although it is not the same strategy identified by
Shatz.

But the essence of these children's responses is best captured

by a model wherein responders are influenced by the presentation of
discrete linguistic and situational cues in their selection of a
pragmatic response.

This is precisely the model suggested by Austin

(1975) for characterizing actual performance rather than theoretical
structure.
It is appropriate to return to Austin and borrow his statement
that what is said here is neither difficult or contentious.

Most

structuralists would not be disturbed by the observation that the
performance of very young children cannot be predicted completely by
structural theory.

Structural theory is, after all, a theory of logic

and linguistics, the construction of proofs for how it is possible that
language can be used to certain ends— in short, a competence theory.
That there are performance phenomena that exceed the parameters of the
preformulated system would not be particularly disturbing to most
structuralists.

Yet these findings indicate that the performance

models developed from structural theory are not entirely adequate.
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The easiest modification to such models would be the incorporation of
additional kinds of contextual conditions into the level at which
felicity conditions are evaluated.

For example, an adult-child play

context such as that used here might function to alert the child to the
possibility that directive interpretations may be warranted even when
the defining conditions for a direct test are met.

A structural model

might lose some clarity, but it would certainly gain validity as a
description of performance by incorporating at least some features of
cue utilization.
On the other hand, the current findings are already consistent
with the cuing model and with contextualist theories in general.

As

Cicourel (1980) has pointed out, communication can be viewed as part of
a complex, multifaceted system.

Action and discourse are embedded in

and sustained by layers of context ranging in globality from eye gaze
to sociocultural setting.

The meaning of any act, therefore, must be

at least partially defined in terms of external conditions that go
beyond the surface linguistic information of the act itself.

Although

these data support such a contextualist view of adult-child discourse
and can be taken as a contribution to the contextualist study of action,
they highlight some problems with the contextualist approach.

First of

all, the contextualist view tends to shortchange the role of intentionality in action, a bias consistently combatted only by Goffman (1959,
1967, 1969, 1981).

Unlike the structuralist approach, contextualism

obscures the essential intentions of speakers and responders, focusing
instead on observable behaviors such as gesture and gaze.

While the

study of natural discourse is incomplete without the consideration of
such overt behavioral cues, one is frequently left with little
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understanding of what was actually intended by an act or how that act
was indeed perceived.

Second, perhaps due to this de-emphasis of

intentionality as a cohesive force, contextualist theories are somewhat
dispersive.

There have been few attempts to organize findings about

different facets of context into a coherent predictive system.

It is

likely that any adequate systematization would have to include aspects
of structural theory (e.g., communicative intent).
There are two options here.

Structural theory can accommodate

overt contextual- cues into performance models, but the adaptation might
not be an easy one;

contextual cuing theory assimilates new evidence

rather easily, but does so by simply adding it to the list rather than
by assigning it a consistent and meaningful role in a larger view of
communicative intentions.

How these data are aligned depends on the

world views of those who evaluate them.

For those who view discourse

as an exemplar of human rationality, children's sensitivity to wording
and gesture are best seen as a step towards understanding a system that
is coherent and structured.

Conversely, investigators approaching any

human act as reflecting emergent properties of social interaction may
see children's performance as revealing a movement towards a subtle
system of contexted discourse.

To date, there have been few efforts to

integrate the clear formalisms of structural theory and the local
production properties of contextual cuing theories.

There is little

doubt that a unified, integrated theory would be a worthwhile endeavour,
expanding the scope and applicability of structural theory while
lending intentionality and coherence to cuing models.
In such an integrated theory, the ability to respond to messages
would be seen as a counterbalancing of constraining forces which are
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internal (child perceptions and knowledge) and external (pragmatic cues
and structures).

The children in this sample are attempting to

negotiate their way through an incompletely understood structured system
by organizing some available surface cues into a simple scheme for
responding to conversational events.

APPENDIX A
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DEBRIEFING INTERVIEW

Before I tell you some of the thing I was looking for, I would like to
ask you some questions about how you talk to your child:

What sort of questions do you ask your child?

For example, do you ask

a lot of "What’s this?" questions, or a lot of "What does a cat say?"
questions?

Do you think that your child knows the words I used in my questions,
and the words he or she would need in order to answer the questions
verbally?
foods?

Does s/he know the names of common animals?

clothing?

objects?

Does s/he use the words, or merely understand them

when others use them?

Let's go over the four types of questions I used, and you tell me
whether you would expect your child to give a good answer:

(a) almost

every time it was asked, (b) only in certain phrasings or in certain
situations, or (c) not at all, i.e., you would be surprised if s/he
gave a good answer.

(Go over each question type).

Why do you think

s/he could/could not answer these questions?

Do you have any question, naming, or action games that you often play
with your child?

What are they?

the games you used to play?

Are those games any different from

For example, did you use to play a lot of

"Where’s your nose?” or "What’s this?" games, but now play a lot more
"What colour is this?" or fantasy games?

How* do/did you use these

games?

Does your child name things spontaneously, or ask for the names of
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objects and people?

Is this a frequent occurrence?

What kinds of play does your child engage in?
people, objects, and actions after the fact?

Does s/he imitate
For example, does s/he

pretend to go to sleep when it's not bedtime, or pretend to feed dolls,
or pretend that objects are something entirely different?
believe or pretend play of any sort?

Any make-

Is your child familiar with the

toys I brought to your house?

Does your child imitate what you say, either immediately or much later?
If s/he does, is it appropriate?

Some children imitate words and

sentences when they are confused, or when they don't know how to
answer a question— does your child ever do this?

I asked your child questions designed to determine how children of this
age answer some kinds of questions.

Most of the questions are

questions which can be answered by an action or by talk.

I wanted to

know how children decide which way to respond, if they respond at all.
Now no child ever answers all the questions appropriately, so I have
one last question before you ask me whatever you want:

what would you

do if you asked a question like one of these and your child didn't
answer you properly (give the answer, drop it, repeat it?)

APPENDIX B
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TABLE 17
ANOVA for percentage of question-requirement types receiving orientation
response components, Experiment I

Source

Age
Error (a)

Mean Square

55.13
210.74

DF

1

F-Value

<1.00

14

Question-requirement

105.13

1

<1.00

Q-requirement X Age

161.99

1

1.25

Error (b)

130.06

14
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TABLE 18
ANOVA for percentage of question-requirement types receiving action
components, Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

1.31

Age

344.53

1

Error (a)

262.34

14

1023.78

1

7.27

47.54

1

< 1.0 0

140.73

14

Question-requirement
Q-requirement X Age
Error (b)

£

<.025
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TABLE

19

ANOVA for number of codable responses, Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

2.21

11.35

1

Error (a)

5.13

14

Discourse

2.87

2

2.24

Discourse X Age

3.66

2'

2.86

Error (b)

1.28

28

38.76

1

16.85

Gesture X Age

1.26

1

< 1.00

Error (c)

2.30

14

.07

2

Gest. X Disc. X Age 1.39

2

Age

Gesture

Gesture X Discourse

Error (d)

.94

28

<

1.00
1.48

,01
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TABLE 20
ANOVA for number of questions ignored, Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

<

1 .0 0

<

1 .0 0

*

1.72

*

.17

1

Error (a)

2.84

14

Discourse

.17

2

Discourse X Age

.79

2

Error (b)

.43

28

20.17

1

Gesture X Age

1.04

1

Error (c)

1.77

14

Gesture X Discourse

1.04

2

15.76

<.01*

Gest. X Disc. X Age

2.04

2

30.91

<.01*

.07

28

Age

Gesture

Error (d)

11.40
<

<.01

1.00

* F- values were evaluated for significance using the conservative
criterion of reducing the degrees of freedom on the repeated measures
variables to 1.

The nonconservative IT .05(2,28) = 3.34.
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TABLE 21
ANOVA for number of ambiguous responses, Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

£

6.66

<.025

1.69

*

Age

7.79

1

Error (a)

1.14

14

Discourse

1.45

2

Discourse X Age

2.91

2

.86

28

3.01

1

3.04

Gesture X Age

.02

1

< 1.00

Error (c)

.99

14

Gesture X Discourse

.95

2

2.02

*

Gesture X Disc. X Age

.82

2

1.74

*

Error (d)

.47

28

Error (b)

Gesture

3.38

.05<p<.10*

* F-values were evaluated for significance using the conservative
criterion of reducing the degrees of freedom on the repeated measures
variable to 1.

The nonconservative F .05(2,28) = 3.34.
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TABLE 22
ANOVA for number of simple orienting responses,
Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

Age

9.37

1

4.11

Error (a)

2.28

14

Discourse

.40

2

< 1 .0 0

Discourse X Age

.60

2

1.43

Error (b)

.42

28

Gesture

4.16

1

5.40

Gesture X Age

2.67

1

3.47

Error (c)

.77

14

Gesture X Discourse

.14

2

< 1 .0 0

Gesture X Disc. X Age

.70

2

1.34

Error (d)

.52

28

.05<p<. 10

<.05
.05<p<. 10
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TABLE 23
ANOVA for number of simple acting responses,
Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

Age

2.34

1

Error (a)

4.74

14

Discourse

.32

Discourse X Age

F-Value

<

1 .0 0

2

<

1.00

. 22

2

<

1 .0 0

Error (b)

1.26

28

Gesture

1.76

1

Gesture X Age

.10

1

Error (c)

.62

14

Gesture X Discourse

.32

Gesture X Disc. X Age
Error (d)

2.84
<

1.00

2

<

1 .0 0

.09

2

<

1.0 0

. 66

28
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TABLE 24
ANOVA for number of reference responses,
Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

Age

4.16

1

Error (a)

3.15

14

Discourse

.66

2

< 1.00

Discourse X Age

.20

2

< 1 .0 0

Error (b)

1. 00

28

Gesture

6.00

1

9.23

Gesture X Age

.04

1

< 1. 00

Error (c)

.65

14

1.16

2

1.33

Gesture X Disc. X Age

.20

2

< 1. 00

Error (d)

.87

28

Gesture X Discourse

1.32

<.01
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TABLE 25
ANOVA for number of conflated responses, Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

ja

2.01

Age

21.09

1

Error (a)

10.49

14

Discourse

.04

2

<

1 .0 0

Discourse X Age

.38

2

<

1.0 0

1.18

28

17.51

1

15.36

<. 01

Gesture X Age

7.60

1

6.67

<.05

Error (c)

1.14

14

Gesture X Discourse

2.67

2

1.48

.49

2

< 1 .0 0

1.81

28

Error (b)

Gesture

Gesture X Disc. X Age
Error (d)
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TABLE 26
ANOVA for number of simple informing responses,
Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

< 1.0 0

Age

1.50

1

Error (a)

4.93

14

Discourse

.32

2

< 1 .0 0

*

Discourse X Age

.22

2

< 1.00

*

1.13

28

16.66

1

13.12

Gesture X Age

1.50

1

1.18

Error (c)

1.27

14

Gesture X Discourse

3.21

2

3.15

.59

2

< 1.00

1.02

28

Error (b)

Gesture.

Gesture X Disc. X Age
Error (d)

.05<p<.10*
*

* F-values were evaluated for significance by conservative criterion of

reducing degrees of freedom on repeated measures to 1.
servative F .05(2,28) = 3.34.

The noncon
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TABLE 27
ANOVA for number of responses that contain orientation,
Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

<

1.00

2

<

1.00

*

.64

2

<

1.0 0

*

1.77

28

21.10

1

21.10

.26

1

< 1.00

Error (c)

1.00

14

Gesture X Discourse

2.47

2

2.66

*

Gesture X Disc. X Age

3.20

2

3.44

*

.93

28

.51

1

Error (a)

1.96

14

Discourse

1.54

Age

Discourse X Age
Error (b)

Gesture
Gesture X Age

Error (d)

<.001

*F-values were evaluated for significance by the conservative criterion
of reducing the degrees of freedom on repeated measures variables to 1.
The nonconversative 1? .05(2,28) = 3.34.
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TABLE 28
ANOVA for number of responses that contain action,
Experiment I

Source

Age

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

ja

1.70

10.01

1

Error (a)

5.89

14

Discourse

.88

2

< 1.00

Discourse X Age

.67

2

<

2.32

28

27.10

1

23.98

<.001

Gesture X Age

7.59

1

6.72

<.025

Error (c)

1.13

14

Gesture X Discourse

1.50

2

<

1.00

.88

2

<

1.00

2.19

28

Error (b)

Gesture

Gesture X Disc. X Age
Error (d)

1 .0 0
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TABLE 29
ANOVA for number or responses that contain informing,
Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

Age

.’ 10.67

1

Error (a)

10.74

14

Discourse

.95

2

< 1 .0 0

Discourse X Age

.38

2

< 1.00

Error (b)

1.26

28

Gesture

2.67

1

1.44

Gesture X Age

1.04

1

< 1.00

Error (c)

1.85

14

Gesture X Discourse

2.01

2

<1.00

.95

2

<1.00

Gesture X Disc. X Age
Error (d)

2.15

DF

28

F-Value

< 1. 00
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TABLE 30
ANOVA

for percentage of questions within circumstances of Experiments
given linguistically codable responses

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

< 1.0 0

Age

533.33

1

Error (a)

952.99

14

Circumstance

411.35

2

2.54

76.40

2

< 1.00

Circumstance X Age
Error (b)

161.68
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TABLE 31
ANOVA for directionality in conflated responses,
Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

Age

54.19

1

Error (a)

16.13

14

Direction

92.34

Direction X Age
Error (b)

F-Value

3.36

.05<p<.10

2

24.56

<.001 *

49.00

2

13.03

< • 001 *

3.76

28

*fj-values were evaluated for significance by reducing the degrees of
freedom on the repeated measures variables to 1.
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TABLE 32
ANOVA for directionality in reference responses,
Experiment I

Source

Mean Square

DF

F-Value

10.08

1

Error (a)

4.92

14

Direction

33.25

2

7.31

<•025*

Direction X Age

20.09

2

4.42

<.05*

4.55

28

Age

Error (b)

2.05

* _F-values were evaluated for significance by conservative criterion of
reducing degrees of freedom on repeated measures to 1.
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